Without preparing international order for RMA 2.0, the very tools to ensure security may become the sources of instability
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has always remained central to the idea of warfare and human evolution. The RMA is the active blueprint for the contemporary revolution in global security. Traditionally, RMA focused on smart bombs, weapons, computerisation, long-range weapons, precision and destruction.
However, RMA 2.0 or the AI-RMA is mainly defined by the shift from human-led precision to machine-led autonomy. This includes Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber and electronic warfare, cognitive warfare, quantum computing, space weaponisation, and autonomous systems. Theorists are of the opinion that the pace of RMA in both theoretical and technological domains has changed the landscape and rulebook of contemporary warfare. The influence of RMA can be broken down into four transformative shifts.
Initially, RMA (articulated in the 1990s) revolved around the notion of quality. RMA 2.0 considers speed as a game-changer. Resultantly, warfare is moving towards a “human-out-of-the-loop” framework. The ability to engage targets at “machine speed” has rendered traditional human-centric decision cycles too slow to survive technological advancement. Despite all the technological development, human judgement still leads the course of war. Theorists believe that technology is still not a substitute for human control.
AI and autonomous systems can compress reaction time, but the absence of human oversight transforms deterrence into automation rather than decision. The threat of speed and machine precision has intensified the already complex security dilemma in the existing security structure. In regions like South Asia, such systems could act faster than diplomacy, raising the risk of escalation without intent. This points to complications, especially when the whole premise of deterrence has been built upon “decision”.
Apparently, AI-enabled command and control systems are revolutionising decision-making, but they have narrowed the space for reflection and democratic processes. Machines process information faster than institutional deliberations, creating a dangerous gap between information and wisdom.
Post-colonial states operating under the stability-instability paradox have found themselves in a commitment trap to develop indigenous capabilities in RMA 2.0 as essential to protect their autonomy and sovereignty
Starting from Military Industrial Complexes (MICs), the commercialisation of military power is now considered a force multiplier both in military and financial terms. Although the monopoly of the developed world over technology has led to technological inequality. Such strategic dependence and control over technological proliferation have redefined the role of middle powers. It may strengthen the politics of poles and the divide between haves and have-nots in international politics.
Post-colonial states operating under the stability-instability paradox have found themselves in a commitment trap to develop indigenous capabilities in RMA 2.0 as essential to protect their autonomy and sovereignty. For instance, Tactical Network-Centric Warfare (T-NCW) allows smaller forces (middle powers) to achieve the desired precision and situational awareness at cost-effective rates, enabling their long-range strike capabilities.
During the 1990s, RMA’s primary focus was “networking” the battlefield (connecting a sensor to a shooter). In 2026, the challenge is not connecting them but processing the “data deluge”. The “System of Systems (SoS)” concept is the foundation for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2).
The concept of SoS is a collection of independent, task-oriented systems that pool their resources and capabilities to create a new and more complex system. Now warfare is focused on “decision advantage” to define success. Modern militaries are using AI and edge computing; modern militaries fuse data from space, cyber, and physical sensors instantly to create a “transparent battlefield” where movement is almost impossible to hide while reducing the element of surprise.
Traditionally, RMA was about kinetic destruction. However, now it includes non-kinetic and psychological dimensions to effectively frame cognitive warfare. The use of AI-driven deepfakes, cyber-attacks, and algorithmic social engineering bypasses physical defences entirely. The goal is to “win without fighting” by paralysing an enemy’s political will or distorting their perception of reality.
Notably, historically, all strategists have described it as strategic excellence. Deterrence in the twenty-first century is no longer about counting missiles or warheads. It is about who controls data, algorithms, and quantum networks. Digital dominance has become a significant component of strategic advantage along with destructive capacity.
These layers range from military, political, digital, and electronic to perceptual domains, often without formal declarations. As a result, the boundaries separating peace and conflict are fading fast; hybrid conflicts are on the rise and grey zone conflicts have become a rational choice. Moreover, the militarisation of orbits, the inclusion of civilian space programmes, and counter-space systems are some of the new spheres of warfare.
Comparison: Classic RMA vs. RMA 2.0
| Feature | Classic RMA (1990s–2010s) | Contemporary Revolution (2020s–2026) |
| Key Driver | Stealth & GPS Precision | AI, Robotics, & Big Data |
| Speed | Near Real-Time (minutes) | Machine Speed (milliseconds) |
| Primary Domain | Air, Land, Sea | Multi-Domain (Cyber, Space, Cognitive) |
| Main Actor | Nation-States (High Budget) | State & non-state (Commercial Tech) |
| Cost | Billion-dollar platforms | Thousand-dollar |
| Impact | Tactical | Strategic |
The realities of the Cold War era have been altered under new dimensions of the global order. Similarly, the arms control treaties signed during the Cold War are unable to manage and regulate decentralised, dual-use, and AI-driven systems, and RMA 2.0. There is an urgent need for adaptive verification regimes that reflect the pace and complexity of modern technologies. However, the significance of state behaviour cannot be overruled or undermined.
The concept of “responsible use” should be articulated under international law and international humanitarian law, as innovation must be guided by ethics, transparency, and restraint. Without preparing the international order for RMA 2.0, the very tools to ensure security may become the sources of instability.