Framing the adversary in South Asia

by Abdul Basit

The transcending avenues of the conflict between India and Pakistan have intensified in recent years, creating risks for regional and global stability.

The hostility emanates from the division of the subcontinent after the British left, creating two separate nations. India’s strategic culture, evolving over decades based on Hindu religious texts, advocating exclusiveness for Hindus, pushed India to pursue a hostile policy against Pakistan. Narrative building against Pakistan and, under its fog, pursuing national interests has been a common practice over time. Indian strategic culture suggests that propaganda is not just a tool used during a war, but it’s also a peacetime continuum. Its primary goal is to maintain superiority, shape international perception of Pakistan as a rogue state, justify repression in IIOJK, and garner domestic electoral support through fear narratives.

In the same vein, India remained persistent in accusing Pakistan of destabilizing the region by allegedly pursuing a nuclear weapons program. However, the reality suggests that India started its nuclear weapons program during the 1960s and conducted its nuclear test in 1974 (Smiling Buddha). Although India vowed to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, it amassed the opportunity to develop its nuclear weapons while blaming Pakistan for the same. The course of propaganda remained constant, accusing Pakistan of nuclear proliferation, while internally fostering its nuclear vision to tests in 1998, compelling Pakistan to follow suit to restore the deterrence. Scholars like George Perkovich explained in his book, India’s Nuclear Bomb, how Indian policy makers used rhetoric about Pakistan’s irresponsibility to legitimize and distract from its nuclear buildup.

India propagated Pakistan and China’s military modernization, while it cleverly excelled in its space militarization program and offensive cyber capabilities. Similarly, India, which already began its integrated guided missile development program during the 1980s, leading to Prithvi and Agni missiles, repeatedly framed Pakistan’s missile program as provocative or destabilizing. In the aftermath of the recent four-day war in May 2025, after facing humiliation at strategic and diplomatic fronts, India resorted to the same rants about Pakistan developing long-range missiles. It appeared to be another attempt to mask its own Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles from international scrutiny. India has recently tested its Agni V missile, capable of striking targets beyond 5,000 km.

Furthermore, Agni VI is expected to be inducted by 2027, with an expected range of between 9000 and 12000 km. With a payload of 3 tonnes, it reaches up to 14000 km, having the capacity to travel up to 16000 km with a lighter payload of 1.5 tonnes. These developments expose India’s offensive strategic posturing while baselessly accusing Pakistan of the same. The pattern is persistent in India, externalizing its strategic ambitions, attributing them to other states, while internally continuing to pursue those very ambitions. The pattern of strategic communication tactics remained the same, which aims to project India as a restrained actor while blaming others for escalation. India is pursuing advanced capabilities similar to those it accuses others of possessing, while simultaneously undermining and posing threats to global security.

—The writer is Associate Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He is also an alumnus of NESA, NDU Washington.

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