THE growing Indian sea-based nuclear military capabilities have gone relatively unnoticed in the international community.
Positioned as a defensive posture as part of second-strike survivability, it was endured as part of India’s nuclear doctrine. However, what is going on beneath the surface is much more destabilizing. India has been advancing and testing nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles with its expanding number of nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs), but there is a dead silence on its command-and-control procedures. As an example, the K-4 missile was billed as being especially long-ranged and very precise. It is not to question its precision, but in nuclear systems, such precision tends to become a sign of abandoning deterrence in favour of counterforce, which targets the retaliatory capabilities of an adversary; this is not the language of stability but the disposition of escalation.
Other submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) being developed in New Delhi include K5 and K6 missiles having 6,000km and 8,000km range, respectively. These facts are sufficient to keep the record straight that Pakistan and China are not the only countries against whom India wants to have its long-range missile capability. Acquiring long-range delivery systems, particularly intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) like Agni-V and K6, etc, is a significant threat to regional and global stability.
The K-series of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), particularly the K-4 and the future K-6, are central to this transformation. Operating from forward bases like Agalega or French territory in Réunion Island, India’s SSBNs could conduct deterrence patrols across the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
India’s growing military footprint in Mauritius, particularly the recent development of dual-use infrastructure on Agalega Island marks a significant shift in New Delhi’s maritime strategy. Although framed as a step toward regional security and logistical support, the airstrip and jetty built by India are widely understood to serve military purposes, enabling the forward deployment of surveillance aircraft and potentially even naval assets.
Given Mauritius’ geographic proximity to key shipping lanes and chokepoints like the Mozambique Channel, this expansion provides India with a platform to project power across the Western Indian Ocean Region. The arrangement also raises questions about sovereignty and strategic autonomy, as both the Mauritian national security adviser and head of the coast guard have traditionally been Indian nationals highlighting the depth of India’s influence in the island nation.
Beyond basing infrastructure, India’s pursuit of long-range and submarine-launched nuclear delivery systems is particularly alarming. The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) such as Agni-V and the speculated Agni-VI with MIRV capability and a range exceeding 10,000 km demonstrates India’s ambition to move beyond regional deterrence. Coupled with the K-series submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), especially the K-4 and the anticipated K-6, India is laying the groundwork for a sea-based nuclear force capable of striking targets across continents. This evolution not only undermines the principle of Credible Minimum Deterrence but also introduces new escalation risks into global security dynamics.
The fact that India is nuclearizing its sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean is the dimension of the geopolitical landscape of South Asia that the world cannot afford to consider as a localized problem. It is a potential war hotspot, cloaked in ambiguity and fueled by reckless armament, long overdue for international attention and scrutiny.
—The writer is a PhD scholar DSS from Quaid-e-Azam University and Research Officer at CISS AJK.
(annieshabbir341@yahoo.com)
