The nations of South Asia are facing serious water challenges that no earlier generation has ever faced. Cooperation between these countries is probably more important now than ever before given the transboundary nature of the major rivers in this region. However, rather than working to make transboundary treaty arrangements more adaptive and climate resilient, current policies appear to be using them more as political weapons. Here, Qurat-ul-Ain Shabbir discusses current developments around the Indus Water Treaty and Ganges Water Treaty, and the critical need for negotiations to prioritise cooperation not confrontation.
Transboundary Rivers are not simply lifelines, but also tools of diplomacy, in the escalating geopolitical environment of South Asia. India has already temporarily halted its engagement in the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a World Bank negotiated accord that had previously weathered the upheavals of India Pakistan relations. At the same time, it has been reported that India might want to renegotiate the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty (GWT) with Bangladesh on the basis of changing ground realities of climate change and rising domestic water needs.
These trends have brought discussions and raised questions about the future of transboundary water cooperation in South Asia, on the lines of equity, fair share, and how such shared resources should be managed in the face of climate-change related volatilities and changing geopolitical dynamics.
The Indus Water Treaty
The IWT, which was signed in 1960, has long been taken as one of the cornerstones of Indo-Pak relations. Surviving three wars and multiple conflicts, the treaty has remained intact; the institutional structure, as well as the understanding of the mutual reliance on shared access to water resources, has played a significant role in its existence.
India unilaterally suspended the Indus water treaty following terrorist attack on tourists in Pahalgam, located in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. India accused Pakistan of cross border terrorism and, in its bid to cut off Pakistan diplomatically, it has put the only water sharing agreement between the rival countries in abeyance. Pakistan on the other hand, made clear to India that shared water resources are vital for Pakistan’s economy and any disruption in the flow of these waters would be considered as an act of war.
This diplomatic stand off on shared water resources is being watched closely by international observers and legal bodies. Recently, on June 27th, the permanent court of arbitration in The Hague has ruled that India’s unilateral move has no bearing on its competence to adjudicate the matter. The court further ruled that India has a continuing responsibility to move forward with proceedings in a timely, efficient and fair manner regardless of its action to put IWT in abeyance.
Pakistan has welcomed the decision of Hague’s court while, as expected, India rejected its decision. The message that this decision has sent is that IWT cannot be unilaterally suspended or put aside by India. But the real question is whether India’s aggressive diplomatic posture on shared waters can undermine its commitments to international law? Because if that happens it will foster a sense of India being selective in the application of international law and treaties norms so as to serve its political and strategic aims, potentially negatively impacting its reputation as a credible regional actor.
The Ganges Water Treaty
Moreover, the GWT, which was signed in 1996 and is due to expire in 2026, regulates water-sharing between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka Barrage. Although the treaty has offered some organizing framework in terms of cooperation, there have been issues relating to fairness and execution.
Bangladesh has time and again expressed its concerns, especially in regards to the reduced release of water during lean seasons harming crops and intensifying environmental stress. Bangladesh claimed to have received less than its allotted share several times during the period between 1997 and 2016. On the other hand India has its own reasons for the renegotiation of the treaty and demanding a larger share of water. These include new hydrologic patterns, growing need in irrigated and industrial water, and more time-flexible and climate-resilient agreements.
Nevertheless, whenever the negotiation take place, it is important to make sure that a new treaty should be adopted to cover all the stakeholders, especially downstream communities in Bangladesh. New frameworks will have to focus on the issues related to minimum flow guarantees, ecological sustainability, and data transparency at the center.
Sailing between the Waters
The issue of South Asian river management is very intricate. The responsibility to maintain balance between national demands, regional commitments and geopolitical maneuvering is in most cases dependent on the upstream nations such as India.
Given recent developments, it has become increasingly evident that a framework of water-sharing agreements that are not just legally bounded, but ecologically enlightened and socially equitable should be in place. The hydrological landscape is changing due to climate change, a rise in variability of river flows and growing populations. These changes require innovative and proactive framework that are not limited to the traditional models of allocation.
As an example, the GWT may be enhanced with adaptive water allocation strategies, climate resilient flood management systems, and common monitoring mechanisms. Without mutually agreeing upon these provisions in the treaty, several areas of concerns would not be addressed which could lead to a more confrontational approach.
Similarly, Between India and Pakistan, international organization like the World Bank, which had already played a key role in the original IWT, could be called upon to mediate and facilitate reform. Climate change is a shared challenge, and India and Pakistan could collaborate on climate adaptation and mitigation strategies, including those related to water resources.
It needs to be understood that geopolitical differences should not be used to disrupt commitments concerning shared water. Transboundary rivers should not be used as political bargaining chips by national governments to fuel unconstructive discourse and adopt a potentially hazardous precedent, a situation whereby upstream nations use a resource, water, as a weapon to coerce downstream nations. These kinds of measures erode trust, regional cooperation and long-term viability of shared ecosystems.
Shared Rivers, Shared Responsibilities
The rivers of South Asia exist beyond political boundaries and their flows pass through the cultures, economies, and histories. With India, Pakistan and Bangladesh struggling to chart a way forward on their mutual water agreements, the imperative of co-operation has never been more timely.
South Asia can ensure a future where shared prosperity supersedes immediate interests by doing more to enforce treaty obligations, foster fair renegotiations, as well as investments in climate resilience on the basin scale. In a world full of climate-stress impacts and regional uncertainties, the position that should adopted at the core of water diplomacy is one of cooperation not confrontation.
Qurat-ul-Ain Shabbir is a PhD scholar and gold medalist in MPhil from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad. She is a research officer at Center for International Strategic Studies (Azad Jammu and Kashmir). Her academic focus lies in addressing the national and regional security developments with a special focus on hydro-politics.
The views expressed in this article belong to the individual authors and do not represent the views of the Global Water Forum, the UNESCO Chair in Water Economics and Transboundary Water Governance, UNESCO, the Australian National University, World Bank, Oxford University, or any of the institutions to which the authors are associated. Please see the Global Water Forum terms and conditions here.
