The recently announced Canada-India uranium deal, valued at nearly $2.8 billion, including Cameco’s shipment of uranium over 10 years, has sparked protests over non-proliferation and regional stability concerns. While Canada’s Foreign Minister and nuclear industry have welcomed the deal, past experiences with India suggest that caution should be exercised. India is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has a history of diverting civilian nuclear material to weapons, most infamously, for its 1974 bomb test. The test was the immediate trigger for the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and subsequent tight export controls. This new collaboration appears to overlook that history. Analysts argue that providing India with imported uranium allows it to dedicate its limited indigenous uranium production to military needs. Treating nuclear-armed states that are non-NPT members as exceptions undermines global non-proliferation norms.
In 1974, India, under the pretext of a so-called peaceful nuclear explosion, conducted its first nuclear test, in which plutonium manufactured in a reactor supplied by Canada was used. This covert uranium employment enraged Western governments and led directly to the formation of the NSG in 1975. Former U.S. officials have long stressed that nuclear exports to India require “special vigilance.” Apart from the NPT, India has not signed the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) nor permitted full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on its entire nuclear program. Therefore, such deals as the Cameco one are awkwardly placed outside the context of international arms control. According to an expert on proliferation, the Canadian eagerness to sell uranium to India can be interpreted as suppliers being willing to compete for the Indian nuclear market at the expense of non-proliferation. Unless accompanied by stringent terms, such commerce will reward rather than reform the previous policy of nuclear vagueness and weaponisation of civilian material in India.
The history of nuclear security in India has been marked by a significant number of nuclear incidents since the 1990s, implying institutional vulnerability. The dozens of cases of fissile or radioactive materials lost, stolen, or smuggled are documented in open-source reporting. For example, in December 2016, Indian officials discovered almost 9 kg of radioactive depleted uranium in the possession of two individuals. In July 2018, Kolkata police caught five men who were allegedly attempting to sell 1 kg of uranium valued at ₹3 crores. More recently, in May 2021, the Maharashtra anti-terrorism squad arrested two suspects with 7.1 kg of natural uranium. Moreover, in August 2024, Bihar police seized 50 grams of californium-252, an extremely dangerous weapons-grade isotope worth about ₹850 crores. Meanwhile, Indian nationals have been caught smuggling fissile materials across borders: in Kathmandu in 2022, two Indians and six Nepalese were arrested with uranium-like material in a car allegedly valued at ₹35 crores/kg.
Canada ought to include a kill-switch provision: if India holds a nuclear test or restarts its special emphasis on fissile material production, it would automatically stop delivery.
These high-profile seizures are not isolated cases; analysts observe a tendency toward theft and smuggling. Recent estimates by independent organisations have identified 25 cases (overall 200 kg of fissile and radioactive material) lost or stolen in India since the notorious 1994 case of Domiasiat (Meghalaya). The number of such violations has led analysts to fear that this is a form of systematic negligence in Indian nuclear security framework that could result in fissile material leaking into the foreign black market. Even Indian specialists have called it a sign of systematic laxity in its nuclear security system. India has failed in the policing of its civil and military stocks many times: even simple precautions like regular inventory and background checks seem to be failing regularly. The accruing history is not that of a few anomalies but of a persistent security issue.
U.S. targeted sanctions also indicate the proliferation history of India. In the last 20 years, the U.S. has blacklisted several Indian organisations and individuals who were involved in unauthorised weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – related exports. As an illustration, the U.S. Treasury in 2003 penalised Protech Consultants Pvt. Ltd. because it supplied equipment to chemical and biological weapons programs in Iraq. In the same year, the U.S. also prohibited NEC Engineers Pvt. Ltd. and its president, Hans Raj Shiv, based on knowingly and materially contributing to weapon programs in Iraq; Shiv was already sanctioned in 2002 pursuant to the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act. In 2004, the State Department announced sanctions on two Indian nuclear scientists, Dr. C. Surender and Dr. Y.S.R. Prasad, under the Iran Non-Proliferation Act, claiming that they had sold missile-related technology to Iran. The problem of proliferation by India has appeared even in recent years. In 2007, two Indian citizens, Parthasarathy Sudarshan and Mythili Gopal, were detained in the U.S. because they had exported sensitive missile-guidance computer technology without permission. These sanctions and prosecutions, including transfers to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, highlight the fact that some of the Indian companies and even individuals have violated international regulations. The new uranium deal, on the other hand, appears to reward the Indian state without addressing these enforcement loopholes.
The most sensitive nuclear sites have been infiltrated several times. For example, independent reporting discovered that from 2010 to 2011 intruders by land and sea broke into the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) complex at least 25 times. The plotter of the 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai is infamously reported to have also toured the BARC location before the attack. These breaches indicate severe design or process failures in the security of critical facilities. According to authoritative reports, the Indian nuclear regulator, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), lacks an adequate security system, which is dangerous in terms of proliferation. Practically, it implies that there is no entirely independent watchdog to ensure compliance with best-practice physical security; internal audits or external inspections by foreign auditors are uncommon. Incidents of security (e.g., theft of radioactive sources, insider attacks, or cyber-attacks) are usually swept under the carpet.
In the meantime, the strategic nuclear forces of India have been increasing. India has approximately 180 warheads today, as estimated by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). According to SIPRI, in 2024, India increased its nuclear capabilities and is currently putting new canister-launched ballistic missiles into operation with multiple warheads. Already, NTI numbers on fissile inventories (0.7 ± 0.16 tons of weapon-grade plutonium and approximately 5.7 tons of HEU) suggest that material for hundreds more weapons is at India’s disposal. In fact, a recent study predicts that India has made enough plutonium to make between 130 and 210 warheads. One study quoted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has even estimated a capacity of more than 1,000 warheads. India may be able to produce plutonium in large quantities as it constructs additional heavy reactors to tap its thorium deposits. In this view, providing India with a guaranteed uranium supply removes the incentive for it to stop or reduce its own fissile material production. It will further destabilise regional security and weaken already fragile arms control.
The deal will compromise international arms control. India is a non-NPT and non-FMCT country; the sale of uranium is against the spirit of both. While other non-signatories have not enjoyed such special treatment, critics will point out the double standard: why treat India differently when it openly declares that it is not planning to stop breeding plutonium? The mass exports of uranium will promote arms races in the region.
The transaction worsens the issue of safety and security. Canada (and other suppliers) have protocols that seek assurances for secure handling, but the record of India does not inspire confidence. Transporting dozens of tons of uranium to India, which has lost dozens of kilograms of uranium due to theft or lack of caution, is seen by most experts as a concerning precedent. Canada and other traders (such as Kazakhstan) have traditionally remained quiet despite officials in India reporting losses of materials with little detail or compensatory action taken. Should there be a massive theft or terrorist action, the political and human impact would be profound, and the brunt of the fault would be vested in the supplier of the material.
When Canada, which has a strong policy of non-proliferation, is ready to trade with India without attaching strict conditions, other suppliers will do the same. It undermines the bargaining power of those states and organisations that have demanded strict export control. In fact, in 2009, Canadian non-proliferation agencies called on Ottawa to ensure a “kill-switch” in case of diversion of fissile material or another test. It seems such appeals have been ignored. The new deal, in turn, appears to be prioritising trade and commerce. Such a strategy risks returning to the tradition of the 1970s: a significant supplier of uranium telling the world that it will sell this stuff regardless of what the recipient does with it.
The sale of uranium to India has far-reaching implications. By conducting nuclear trade with a non-NPT state in the absence of a fissile-cutoff regime, Canada likely undermines the normative power of international law. The FMCT is languishing, and India has refused to accept any cut-off. India will shortly get heaps of uranium with no promise of stopping its own fissile material production. Critics believe this sends an implicit message to other de facto nuclear powers that it is possible to reward big producers with trade deals even without official promises to disarm.
Second, the transaction encourages a local arms competition. Pakistan has already criticised the Canada-India pact, stating that it would seek its own nuclear build-up in retaliation. The deal, by drastically increasing the availability of fuel to India (thus making domestically produced uranium available for weapons production), effectively brings down the barrier to producing more bombs. According to SIPRI and NTI reports, India can reuse its domestic high-grade uranium in weapons manufacturing once foreign fuel arrives. Many Indian reactors are not under IAEA inspection. Plutonium-producing research reactors (e.g., Cirus, Dhruva) would not be safeguarded. In this way, the imports of uranium would indirectly increase the unsafeguarded plutonium stockpile in India. Pakistan will not fail to observe an increase in the Indian fissile production and counter any such increase with its own production to maintain the regional balance. The dangers are also increased by the fact that South Asia in the past has been among the most unstable nuclear hotspots. The relief that Canada would offer to the civil program of India with good intentions is at the wrong time, when the regional tensions are already high.
Third, the security of this trade is questionable. The Canadian government says that it will make India fulfill certain security requirements, but little is known. Considering India has failed to maintain control on several occasions, specialists are not convinced about India’s preparedness. All Canadian uranium shipped by sea will have to go through several borders and chokepoints. Previous Indian experience indicates that criminal networks may attack such shipments. For instance, in 2003, a militant faction was apprehended with 225 g of processed uranium. These incidents clearly reveal the vulnerability of India’s nuclear facilities.
Lastly, the agreement sets a bad precedent. Traditionally, Canada has been a proponent of non-proliferation. The sale of uranium to India, which is not signatory to the NPT, CTBT, and FMCT, and has a history of radioactive material theft and sensitive nuclear facility security breaches, seems to be ripping apart the fabric of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime. It implicitly sanctions India to be a quasi-nuclear-weapon state without fulfilling the requirements. This creates a double standard for aspiring and rogue nuclear states. Even states such as Brazil or South Korea may ask: Why do you only reward India? Concisely, the Canada-India agreement might bring in temporary business benefits, but it compromises the long-term objective of enhancing multilateral arms control.
With these threats, international institutions must demand that India provide substantial security and non-proliferation assurances. India must be obliged by the agreement not to test nuclear weapons or increase the production of fissile material. Canada ought to include a kill-switch provision: if India holds a nuclear test or restarts its special emphasis on fissile material production, it would automatically stop delivery.
Canada and other nations must urge India to agree to other IAEA safeguards on the supplied uranium. This may take the form of India voluntarily making its civil reactors subject to complete scope inspections or undergoing international monitoring of new thorium breeder facilities. Moreover, India must permit third-party audits of its nuclear material accounting on a regular basis. In the absence of such measures, the provision of uranium is virtually the transfer of dozens of kilograms of fissile material to a black box.
Canada ought to visibly tighten its own export-control system. For example, it should give domestic arms regulators increased powers to perform checks of downstream Indian fuel plants. Close monitoring of the disposal of the uranium and verifying end-use should be done carefully. Canada must also liaise with other supplier states to have a unified approach. In case any security incident takes place, Canada must insist on an investigation by the IAEA, and the findings need to be made public.
The Canada-India uranium deal, as it stands today, threatens global and regional stability. With India’s history of nuclear diversions, thefts, and security lapses, Canadian policymakers must tie sales to tight, verifiable security guarantees. Otherwise, this deal will fuel the arms race and proliferation threats in the region.
