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Ukraine’s inadequate war preparedness and disarmament have proven to be the primary reasons for their current plight. The conflict has highlighted the importance of investing in defense infrastructure and being prepared for any external threats.
Pakistan survives in a challenging security environment due to its geopolitical location and the history of unresolved conflicts. Pakistan is either an immediate or a distant neighbor of three declared (India, Russia, and China) and two suspected (Iran and Israel) nuclear powers. Not only this, but Pakistan and India have been entangled in a long history of mistrust, conflicts, and ideological differences. These differences led them to fight at least four full-scale and limited wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Moreover in 2002, 2008 and 2019, both states came at the brink of war due to an unexpected turn of events. The military forces were in eyeball to eyeball contact on international borders and on the Line of Control (LOC). However, the war was averted due to international mediation and successful implementation of de-escalation ladder. Recently the annual threat assessment report-2021, prepared by the office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), warned that “under the leadership of Prime Minister (PM) Modi, India is more likely than in the past to respond with military force to perceived or real Pakistani provocations.” The report noted that “heightened tensions” in the region “raise the risk of conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, with violent unrest in Kashmir or a militant attack in India being the potential flashpoints.” But the report also said that “a general war” between India and Pakistan during 2021 was unlikely, but “crises between the two are likely to become more intense, risking an escalatory cycle.” Another U.S. intelligence report to Congress had warned that India and Pakistan could go to war in the next five years over real and perceived provocations. The report pointed out that some regional conflicts such as the fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, had “direct implications for U.S. security,” while “tensions between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan remain a concern for the world.” Despite the fact that these reports acknowledged the volatile security situation in South Asia, they did not suggest either any de-escalation ladder/cycle or peaceful conflict resolution mechanism. The report also used contested terms such as “provocation by Pakistan,” but chose not to mention that despite several efforts, Modi regime could not provoke Pakistan’s policymakers to risk regional peace. Those acts of provocation by Modi regime includes revocation of Article 370 in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), Balakot strike in Pakistan after using a false flag operation as a justification, and accidental firing of BrahMos missile on Pakistan’s soil while violating international law and sovereignty of Pakistan. The list expands further if Indian activities to destabilize Pakistan in hybrid war are also included. The arrest of Indian spy and serving naval officer, Kulbhushan Jadhav from Pakistan’s province, Balochistan, substantiates the claims of India using proxies against Pakistan.
Contemporary international security order is passing through an implicit transition due to the Russian-Ukraine war.
Pakistan has been fighting the War on Terror since long. The phenomenon of terrorism has further complicated the regional security landscape. It is noteworthy that despite all these structural limitations, Pakistan successfully mediated a peace deal between the USA and Taliban to provide a safe exit to the U.S. forces and peaceful transition of power in Kabul. All these challenges of geopolinomics1 have led Pakistan to ensure its security and to effectively address the threat perception since 1947. Contemporary international security order is passing through an implicit transition due to the Russia-Ukraine war. The importance of tailor-made defense policies to address threat perceptions emerging from regional, historical, and global context and self-reliance in terms of capacity, capabilities and potential to ensure one’s sovereignty and security has been highlighted. It has further raised another question regarding the utility and relevance of disarmament within the security context of each state. Disarmament does not appear fit for all models for everyone. It is pertinent to learn lessons from Russia-Ukraine war, especially from the perspective of Pakistan. Two significant reasons emerge for the plight of Ukraine in the present milieu: Ukraine’s Disarmament in 1994 (Massandra Accords); and poor state of preparedness for a conventional war.
In his article, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” John J. Mearsheimer, an American political scientist and renowned scholar of International Relations, tried to explain the Russian strategic choices under the framework of defensive realism and considered the western policies towards Russia responsible for Ukraine crisis of 2014.
Review of Ukraine’s Disarmament After the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, the management of 30,000 nuclear weapons spread over the territories of four newly sovereign states, i.e., Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine was an immediate threat to international peace. The command and control of strategic weapons requires a good amount of funding and technical assistance. It is noteworthy that Ukraine’s pre-independence movement supported efforts to join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. This was the background in which after the “Declaration of Sovereignty” on July 16, 1990, Ukraine pledged “not to accept, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons.” The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), generally known as the newly independent former soviet states, signed the Minsk Agreement on December 30, 1991. CIS agreed to give charge of all nuclear armaments to the Russian government. However, according to the agreement, as long as the weapons remained in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the governments of those countries would have the right to veto their use. Minsk Agreement declared the end of 1994 as the target date for dismantling these weapons. On May 23, 1992, Ukraine was among the signatories of Lisbon Protocol. The protocol pledged to return the nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to Russia and all these states to join Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and NPT. The protocol required that Ukraine adheres to NPT as quickly as possible; however, it took Ukraine up to seven years to follow through. According to different reports by late 1992, the Ukrainian parliament was vocalizing more pro-nuclear views. Some believed that Ukraine was entitled to at least temporary nuclear weapon status. Perhaps optimistically, the U.S. government promised Ukraine $175 million in dismantlement assistance. Instead, the Ukrainian government began implementing administrative management of the nuclear forces and claimed ownership of the warheads. Not only this, but in late April 1993, 162 Ukrainian politicians signed a statement to add 13 preconditions for the ratification of START, frustrating the ratification process. The preconditions required security assurances from Russia and the United States, foreign aid for dismantlement, and compensation for the nuclear material. In May 1993, the United States said that if Ukraine were to ratify START, Washington would provide more financial assistance. This began the subsequent discussions between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States over the future of Ukrainian denuclearization. In 1993, Ukrainian and Russian officials reached a set of agreements, including protocols on nuclear weapons dismantlement, procedure, and terms of compensation known as Massandra Accords. However, the two sides could not agree on the final document, and the summit ultimately failed. The Massandra Accords set the stage for the ultimately successful trilateral talks. As the United States mediated between Russia and Ukraine, the three countries signed the Trilateral Statement on January 14, 1994. Ukraine committed to full disarmament, including strategic weapons, in exchange for economic support and security assurances from the United States and Russia. Ukraine ratified START on February 3, 1994, repealing its earlier preconditions, but it would not accede to the NPT without further security assurances. In order to solidify security commitments to Ukraine, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances on December 5, 1994. A political agreement in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Accords, the memorandum included security assurances against the threat or use of force against Ukraine’s territory or political independence. In response, Ukraine officially acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on December 5, 1994. Interestingly, in 2009, Russia and the United States released a joint statement confirming that the security assurances made in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum would still be valid after START expired in 2009.
The conflict has highlighted the importance of maintaining a robust defense system to protect the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Russian troops entered the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine in March 2014. On March 18, over the protest of the acting government in Kiev, the United Nations Security Council and the Western governments, Russia declared the annexation of Crimea. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine called the action a blatant violation of the security assurances in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. However, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, “The security assurances were given to the legitimate government of Ukraine but not to the forces that came to power following the coup d’etat.” West’s Fault Caused the Rope to Snap In his article, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” John J. Mearsheimer, an American political scientist and renowned scholar of International Relations, tried to explain the Russian strategic choices under the framework of defensive realism and considered the western policies towards Russia responsible for Ukraine crisis of 2014. According to him, the aim of West was to move Ukraine towards their ambit and to convince them to join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as become part of the European Union (EU)’s expansion towards Eastern Europe. This resulted in triggering Russian insecurity. It is noteworthy that Russian leaders, particularly President Putin, has mentioned that Russia cannot allow its neighbors to ally with the West as it poses a direct threat to Russian security. Moreover, Russia’s first foreign policy doctrine known as “Near Abroad” clearly stated that Russian sovereignty and interests will be protected at the borders of post-Soviet states and Russia would provide them a security umbrella. Apparently, the slow response of West during Crimea crisis manifested the inability of the West to protect Ukrainians. The inability and unwillingness of the West to go beyond non-military moves is actually helping to contain the armed conflict outside EU. The situation has also challenged the relevance of security guarantees, extended deterrence, and integrated deterrence. Apparently, self-sufficiency and self-reliance to ensure one’s security and sovereignty is the most reliable strategic option. A historical check reveals that the Ukrainians are not the only one to face such consequences after relying on others for their defense. In 1971, Pakistan has also faced such a situation when the promised U.S. 7th Fleet didn’t reach for support. Furthermore, the efforts to restrain nuclear proliferation has become rot and the prediction of John F. Kennedy becomes true that is, the spread of nukes may wind up just being premature, not wrong. That would surely be very catastrophic and regrettable for the future of international security. The concept of extended deterrence appears to be a mere puff. In a world bristling with weapons with the potential to end human civilization, nonproliferation itself is a morally worthwhile and an even necessary goal. But the experience of countries that actually have disarmed is likely to lead more of them to conclude otherwise in the future. Inadequate State of Preparedness for Conventional War Having a strong defense force is essential for any country’s sovereignty and protection from external threats. The example of Ukraine highlights the importance of a robust military. In the recent years, the annexation of Crimea and presently a bloody conflict in eastern Ukraine is the outcome of this weakness. If Ukraine had a stronger defense force, it would have been able to resist Russia’s aggression more effectively. A robust military can deter potential aggressors and provide a sense of security to citizens. It can also aid in responding to natural disasters and provide assistance during emergencies. Ukraine has faced significant challenges in its defense preparedness over the years. Here are a few key areas where Ukraine has faced deficiencies: Lack of Modern Weaponry. One of the biggest challenges faced by the Ukrainian military was a lack of modern weaponry. Ukraine inherited a large military arsenal from the Soviet Union, but much of it is now outdated and in need of modernization. This has made it difficult for Ukraine to effectively defend itself against modern Russian military equipment. Limited Financial Resources. Ukraine’s defense budget has been limited in the recent years due to economic challenges, which has made it difficult to invest in modernizing and improving its military capabilities. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)2, Ukraine’s defense budget for the past five years (2016-2021) in U.S. dollars, is as follows:
Inadequate Training and Preparedness. Despite efforts to reform and modernize its military, Ukraine’s armed forces have struggled with inadequate training and preparedness. This has been a significant issue during times of conflict, as Ukrainian forces have been outmatched by better-trained and better-equipped Russian forces.
The biggest lesson of Russia-Ukraine war is the futility of extended or integrated deterrence. Countries use their strategic weapons to protect their own interests not the interests of other states. One cannot ignore the fact that the assurances given to Ukraine for nuclear disarmament could not prevent the destruction of Ukraine.
Political Instability. Ukraine’s political instability has also impacted its defense preparedness, with changes in government and leadership causing disruptions in military planning and decision-making. Lessons Learnt The Russian-Ukraine war has had significant implications/lessons for Pakistan’s defense preparedness. Ukraine’s inadequate war preparedness and disarmament have proven to be the primary reasons for their current plight. The conflict has highlighted the importance of investing in defense infrastructure and being prepared for any external threats. As a country that has faced numerous security challenges in the past, Pakistan must take these lessons seriously and prioritize the development of its defense capabilities. A few takeaways are appended below: Never Underestimate the Importance of a Robust Military. Ukraine’s military was weakened by years of neglect and corruption, making it vulnerable to Russian aggression. The conflict has highlighted the importance of maintaining a robust defense system to protect the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is crucial to invest in military modernization and training to maintain a strong defense force. Be Prepared for Unconventional Warfare. The conflict has also demonstrated the importance of having a strong military presence. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in eastern Ukraine was a hybrid war that combined conventional military tactics with non-military means such as cyberattacks, propaganda, and covert operations. Countries need to be prepared for such hybrid threats and develop strategies to counter them. Military Modernization and Training. Ukraine’s military lacked the necessary equipment and resources to defend itself effectively which highlighted the need for countries to be prepared for any potential threat, which has further emphasized the importance of defense spending. Therefore, one of the primary lessons that Pakistan can learn from the Ukrainian conflict is the importance of maintaining a robust defense budget. Ukraine’s relatively low defense budget coupled with mismanagement left its military ill-equipped to deal with the Russian invasion. Pakistan, which faces significant security challenges in the region, must continue to ensure that its military is adequately equipped and trained to respond to any potential threats. Futility of Extended Deterrence. The biggest lesson of Russia-Ukraine war is the futility of extended or integrated deterrence. Countries use their strategic weapons to protect their own interests not the interests of other states. One cannot ignore the fact that the assurances given to Ukraine for nuclear disarmament could not prevent the destruction of Ukraine. These trends and patterns of international security have substantiated Pakistan’s defense and nuclear policy. A position of power in international system is one of the best recipes to ensure peace for one’s own people. Maintain Diplomatic Channels. Despite the conflict, Ukraine has maintained diplomatic channels with Russia, which has been critical in negotiating ceasefires and prisoner exchanges. Diplomacy can help prevent conflicts from escalating and create opportunities for peaceful resolution. Foster a Strong National Identity. Ukraine’s national identity and pride played a crucial role in mobilizing the population to support the military and resist the aggression. A united nation with a proud national identity can provide the motivation and resilience needed to defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In conclusion, Ukraine’s experience serves as a stark reminder of the value of self-reliant strategic projections and apt war preparedness. The lack of these critical factors has left Ukraine vulnerable to external threats and caused immense suffering for its people. As Pakistan faces its own security challenges, it must take heed of Ukraine’s example and prioritize its modernization of defense forces to counter any conventional/non-conventional threats. It is only by learning from the mistakes of others and taking proactive measures that Pakistan can avoid any such crises and continue building a stable and prosperous future for its people.
The writer is Executive Director at the Center for International Strategic Studies, AJK and the author of Shaking Hands with Clenched Fists: The Grand Trunk Road to Confidence Building Measures between Pakistan and India. E-mail: asmakhawaja@gmail.com
Pakistan survives in a challenging security environment due to its geopolitical location and the history of unresolved conflicts. Pakistan is either an immediate or a distant neighbor of three declared (India, Russia, and China) and two suspected (Iran and Israel) nuclear powers. Not only this, but Pakistan and India have been entangled in a long history of mistrust, conflicts, and ideological differences. These differences led them to fight at least four full-scale and limited wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. Moreover in 2002, 2008 and 2019, both states came at the brink of war due to an unexpected turn of events. The military forces were in eyeball to eyeball contact on international borders and on the Line of Control (LOC). However, the war was averted due to international mediation and successful implementation of de-escalation ladder. Recently the annual threat assessment report-2021, prepared by the office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI), warned that “under the leadership of Prime Minister (PM) Modi, India is more likely than in the past to respond with military force to perceived or real Pakistani provocations.” The report noted that “heightened tensions” in the region “raise the risk of conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, with violent unrest in Kashmir or a militant attack in India being the potential flashpoints.” But the report also said that “a general war” between India and Pakistan during 2021 was unlikely, but “crises between the two are likely to become more intense, risking an escalatory cycle.” Another U.S. intelligence report to Congress had warned that India and Pakistan could go to war in the next five years over real and perceived provocations. The report pointed out that some regional conflicts such as the fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, had “direct implications for U.S. security,” while “tensions between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan remain a concern for the world.” Despite the fact that these reports acknowledged the volatile security situation in South Asia, they did not suggest either any de-escalation ladder/cycle or peaceful conflict resolution mechanism. The report also used contested terms such as “provocation by Pakistan,” but chose not to mention that despite several efforts, Modi regime could not provoke Pakistan’s policymakers to risk regional peace. Those acts of provocation by Modi regime includes revocation of Article 370 in Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), Balakot strike in Pakistan after using a false flag operation as a justification, and accidental firing of BrahMos missile on Pakistan’s soil while violating international law and sovereignty of Pakistan. The list expands further if Indian activities to destabilize Pakistan in hybrid war are also included. The arrest of Indian spy and serving naval officer, Kulbhushan Jadhav from Pakistan’s province, Balochistan, substantiates the claims of India using proxies against Pakistan.
Contemporary international security order is passing through an implicit transition due to the Russian-Ukraine war.
Pakistan has been fighting the War on Terror since long. The phenomenon of terrorism has further complicated the regional security landscape. It is noteworthy that despite all these structural limitations, Pakistan successfully mediated a peace deal between the USA and Taliban to provide a safe exit to the U.S. forces and peaceful transition of power in Kabul. All these challenges of geopolinomics1 have led Pakistan to ensure its security and to effectively address the threat perception since 1947. Contemporary international security order is passing through an implicit transition due to the Russia-Ukraine war. The importance of tailor-made defense policies to address threat perceptions emerging from regional, historical, and global context and self-reliance in terms of capacity, capabilities and potential to ensure one’s sovereignty and security has been highlighted. It has further raised another question regarding the utility and relevance of disarmament within the security context of each state. Disarmament does not appear fit for all models for everyone. It is pertinent to learn lessons from Russia-Ukraine war, especially from the perspective of Pakistan. Two significant reasons emerge for the plight of Ukraine in the present milieu: Ukraine’s Disarmament in 1994 (Massandra Accords); and poor state of preparedness for a conventional war.
In his article, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” John J. Mearsheimer, an American political scientist and renowned scholar of International Relations, tried to explain the Russian strategic choices under the framework of defensive realism and considered the western policies towards Russia responsible for Ukraine crisis of 2014.
Review of Ukraine’s Disarmament After the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, the management of 30,000 nuclear weapons spread over the territories of four newly sovereign states, i.e., Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine was an immediate threat to international peace. The command and control of strategic weapons requires a good amount of funding and technical assistance. It is noteworthy that Ukraine’s pre-independence movement supported efforts to join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. This was the background in which after the “Declaration of Sovereignty” on July 16, 1990, Ukraine pledged “not to accept, produce, or acquire nuclear weapons.” The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), generally known as the newly independent former soviet states, signed the Minsk Agreement on December 30, 1991. CIS agreed to give charge of all nuclear armaments to the Russian government. However, according to the agreement, as long as the weapons remained in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the governments of those countries would have the right to veto their use. Minsk Agreement declared the end of 1994 as the target date for dismantling these weapons. On May 23, 1992, Ukraine was among the signatories of Lisbon Protocol. The protocol pledged to return the nuclear weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to Russia and all these states to join Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and NPT. The protocol required that Ukraine adheres to NPT as quickly as possible; however, it took Ukraine up to seven years to follow through. According to different reports by late 1992, the Ukrainian parliament was vocalizing more pro-nuclear views. Some believed that Ukraine was entitled to at least temporary nuclear weapon status. Perhaps optimistically, the U.S. government promised Ukraine $175 million in dismantlement assistance. Instead, the Ukrainian government began implementing administrative management of the nuclear forces and claimed ownership of the warheads. Not only this, but in late April 1993, 162 Ukrainian politicians signed a statement to add 13 preconditions for the ratification of START, frustrating the ratification process. The preconditions required security assurances from Russia and the United States, foreign aid for dismantlement, and compensation for the nuclear material. In May 1993, the United States said that if Ukraine were to ratify START, Washington would provide more financial assistance. This began the subsequent discussions between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States over the future of Ukrainian denuclearization. In 1993, Ukrainian and Russian officials reached a set of agreements, including protocols on nuclear weapons dismantlement, procedure, and terms of compensation known as Massandra Accords. However, the two sides could not agree on the final document, and the summit ultimately failed. The Massandra Accords set the stage for the ultimately successful trilateral talks. As the United States mediated between Russia and Ukraine, the three countries signed the Trilateral Statement on January 14, 1994. Ukraine committed to full disarmament, including strategic weapons, in exchange for economic support and security assurances from the United States and Russia. Ukraine ratified START on February 3, 1994, repealing its earlier preconditions, but it would not accede to the NPT without further security assurances. In order to solidify security commitments to Ukraine, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances on December 5, 1994. A political agreement in accordance with the principles of the Helsinki Accords, the memorandum included security assurances against the threat or use of force against Ukraine’s territory or political independence. In response, Ukraine officially acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on December 5, 1994. Interestingly, in 2009, Russia and the United States released a joint statement confirming that the security assurances made in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum would still be valid after START expired in 2009.
The conflict has highlighted the importance of maintaining a robust defense system to protect the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
Russian troops entered the Crimean peninsula of Ukraine in March 2014. On March 18, over the protest of the acting government in Kiev, the United Nations Security Council and the Western governments, Russia declared the annexation of Crimea. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine called the action a blatant violation of the security assurances in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. However, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, “The security assurances were given to the legitimate government of Ukraine but not to the forces that came to power following the coup d’etat.” West’s Fault Caused the Rope to Snap In his article, “Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” John J. Mearsheimer, an American political scientist and renowned scholar of International Relations, tried to explain the Russian strategic choices under the framework of defensive realism and considered the western policies towards Russia responsible for Ukraine crisis of 2014. According to him, the aim of West was to move Ukraine towards their ambit and to convince them to join North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as become part of the European Union (EU)’s expansion towards Eastern Europe. This resulted in triggering Russian insecurity. It is noteworthy that Russian leaders, particularly President Putin, has mentioned that Russia cannot allow its neighbors to ally with the West as it poses a direct threat to Russian security. Moreover, Russia’s first foreign policy doctrine known as “Near Abroad” clearly stated that Russian sovereignty and interests will be protected at the borders of post-Soviet states and Russia would provide them a security umbrella. Apparently, the slow response of West during Crimea crisis manifested the inability of the West to protect Ukrainians. The inability and unwillingness of the West to go beyond non-military moves is actually helping to contain the armed conflict outside EU. The situation has also challenged the relevance of security guarantees, extended deterrence, and integrated deterrence. Apparently, self-sufficiency and self-reliance to ensure one’s security and sovereignty is the most reliable strategic option. A historical check reveals that the Ukrainians are not the only one to face such consequences after relying on others for their defense. In 1971, Pakistan has also faced such a situation when the promised U.S. 7th Fleet didn’t reach for support. Furthermore, the efforts to restrain nuclear proliferation has become rot and the prediction of John F. Kennedy becomes true that is, the spread of nukes may wind up just being premature, not wrong. That would surely be very catastrophic and regrettable for the future of international security. The concept of extended deterrence appears to be a mere puff. In a world bristling with weapons with the potential to end human civilization, nonproliferation itself is a morally worthwhile and an even necessary goal. But the experience of countries that actually have disarmed is likely to lead more of them to conclude otherwise in the future. Inadequate State of Preparedness for Conventional War Having a strong defense force is essential for any country’s sovereignty and protection from external threats. The example of Ukraine highlights the importance of a robust military. In the recent years, the annexation of Crimea and presently a bloody conflict in eastern Ukraine is the outcome of this weakness. If Ukraine had a stronger defense force, it would have been able to resist Russia’s aggression more effectively. A robust military can deter potential aggressors and provide a sense of security to citizens. It can also aid in responding to natural disasters and provide assistance during emergencies. Ukraine has faced significant challenges in its defense preparedness over the years. Here are a few key areas where Ukraine has faced deficiencies: Lack of Modern Weaponry. One of the biggest challenges faced by the Ukrainian military was a lack of modern weaponry. Ukraine inherited a large military arsenal from the Soviet Union, but much of it is now outdated and in need of modernization. This has made it difficult for Ukraine to effectively defend itself against modern Russian military equipment. Limited Financial Resources. Ukraine’s defense budget has been limited in the recent years due to economic challenges, which has made it difficult to invest in modernizing and improving its military capabilities. According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)2, Ukraine’s defense budget for the past five years (2016-2021) in U.S. dollars, is as follows:
Inadequate Training and Preparedness. Despite efforts to reform and modernize its military, Ukraine’s armed forces have struggled with inadequate training and preparedness. This has been a significant issue during times of conflict, as Ukrainian forces have been outmatched by better-trained and better-equipped Russian forces.
The biggest lesson of Russia-Ukraine war is the futility of extended or integrated deterrence. Countries use their strategic weapons to protect their own interests not the interests of other states. One cannot ignore the fact that the assurances given to Ukraine for nuclear disarmament could not prevent the destruction of Ukraine.
Political Instability. Ukraine’s political instability has also impacted its defense preparedness, with changes in government and leadership causing disruptions in military planning and decision-making. Lessons Learnt The Russian-Ukraine war has had significant implications/lessons for Pakistan’s defense preparedness. Ukraine’s inadequate war preparedness and disarmament have proven to be the primary reasons for their current plight. The conflict has highlighted the importance of investing in defense infrastructure and being prepared for any external threats. As a country that has faced numerous security challenges in the past, Pakistan must take these lessons seriously and prioritize the development of its defense capabilities. A few takeaways are appended below: Never Underestimate the Importance of a Robust Military. Ukraine’s military was weakened by years of neglect and corruption, making it vulnerable to Russian aggression. The conflict has highlighted the importance of maintaining a robust defense system to protect the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. It is crucial to invest in military modernization and training to maintain a strong defense force. Be Prepared for Unconventional Warfare. The conflict has also demonstrated the importance of having a strong military presence. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and involvement in eastern Ukraine was a hybrid war that combined conventional military tactics with non-military means such as cyberattacks, propaganda, and covert operations. Countries need to be prepared for such hybrid threats and develop strategies to counter them. Military Modernization and Training. Ukraine’s military lacked the necessary equipment and resources to defend itself effectively which highlighted the need for countries to be prepared for any potential threat, which has further emphasized the importance of defense spending. Therefore, one of the primary lessons that Pakistan can learn from the Ukrainian conflict is the importance of maintaining a robust defense budget. Ukraine’s relatively low defense budget coupled with mismanagement left its military ill-equipped to deal with the Russian invasion. Pakistan, which faces significant security challenges in the region, must continue to ensure that its military is adequately equipped and trained to respond to any potential threats. Futility of Extended Deterrence. The biggest lesson of Russia-Ukraine war is the futility of extended or integrated deterrence. Countries use their strategic weapons to protect their own interests not the interests of other states. One cannot ignore the fact that the assurances given to Ukraine for nuclear disarmament could not prevent the destruction of Ukraine. These trends and patterns of international security have substantiated Pakistan’s defense and nuclear policy. A position of power in international system is one of the best recipes to ensure peace for one’s own people. Maintain Diplomatic Channels. Despite the conflict, Ukraine has maintained diplomatic channels with Russia, which has been critical in negotiating ceasefires and prisoner exchanges. Diplomacy can help prevent conflicts from escalating and create opportunities for peaceful resolution. Foster a Strong National Identity. Ukraine’s national identity and pride played a crucial role in mobilizing the population to support the military and resist the aggression. A united nation with a proud national identity can provide the motivation and resilience needed to defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. In conclusion, Ukraine’s experience serves as a stark reminder of the value of self-reliant strategic projections and apt war preparedness. The lack of these critical factors has left Ukraine vulnerable to external threats and caused immense suffering for its people. As Pakistan faces its own security challenges, it must take heed of Ukraine’s example and prioritize its modernization of defense forces to counter any conventional/non-conventional threats. It is only by learning from the mistakes of others and taking proactive measures that Pakistan can avoid any such crises and continue building a stable and prosperous future for its people.
The writer is Executive Director at the Center for International Strategic Studies, AJK and the author of Shaking Hands with Clenched Fists: The Grand Trunk Road to Confidence Building Measures between Pakistan and India. E-mail: asmakhawaja@gmail.com
