Scholars have espoused new concepts like ‘Strategic Trilemma’ or ‘Strategic Chain’ to describe the relationship between three nuclear power states or more than three nuclear states. In strategic matters, the lexicon plays an important role, and new concepts can have certain implications for the comprehension of a state’s nuclear strategy. In South Asia, there are two nuclear states, India and Pakistan, however, certain scholars have also included China into the equation. The coupling of two different dyads – India-Pakistan and India-China – into a one single trilemma would only increase intricacies in the region that can further hinder the process of arms control. For enhancing strategic stability, it is critical to avoid complexity in discourse and focus on dyadic relations between states rather than trilemmas or chains.
The concept of ‘Strategic Trilemma’ or ‘Triangle’ has been used by scholars to describe the complex relationship between three nuclear states. It is generally associated with the nuclear relationship existing between China, India, and Pakistan. However, this notion can also be extended to other nuclear power states that have a complex relationship with each other. For example, it can be said a Trilemma exists between the United States, China, and Russia. This concept of ‘Trilemma’ has also been extended by some scholars to ‘Nuclear Tetraplex’ that there is a chain of relations between the United States, China, India, and Pakistan. This concept emphasizes that strategic decisions undertaken by the United States would have effects on all the states in the chain. One scholar has even gone further and propounded the concept of ‘Pentapolar Nuclear System’ in Asia which include the United States, China, Russia, India, and Japan. There is no fixed delineation for including as many nuclear states in the strategic chain as possible. Because of the complex nature of relationships among states in the modern world, events in one corner of the world would have implications in the other. However, linking nuclear states together would only complicate the strategic equation, making it further difficult for states to manage their conflict.
There is a need to understand the perils of organizing India, Pakistan, and China in one strategic triangle. For instance, this can be compared with another emerging strategic triangle – China, the United States, and India. There are two dyads in this triangle (The United States-China dyad and the China-India dyad). The United States is at the apex of the triangle because it has strategic relations with both India and China. The Indo-U.S. strategic leg is cooperative, and the China-U.S. strategic leg is competitive.
The developments in one strategic leg can have implications for the other strategic leg. For example, Chinese nuclear modernization to improve its strategic position vis-à-vis the United States can be used by India to justify its nuclear modernization and forging a closer strategic partnership with the United States. This triangular relationship, however, would only complicate any kind of arms control negotiations at the bilateral level between the United States and China. It would be difficult to have a three-way arms control negotiation or nuclear risk reduction measures. The same can be said about the strategic trilemma between India, Pakistan, and China. A three-way understanding would only complicate arms control and nuclear risk reduction measures between the three states. Scholars of strategy should focus on separating the three states into dyads to increase the possibility of risk reduction measures.
Another challenge arises in the form of different nuclear postures and strategic priorities of a state that can only be complicated by linking more than two nuclear states together. Every nuclear state has a different strategic reality and objective that shapes its nuclear posture. There is no one-fit-all model of arms control that can be applied to all nuclear states. In short, it is far more difficult to negotiate nuclear arms control agreements between more than two states and only complicates the risk reduction measures.
An example of the difficulty in achieving a consensus by more than two nuclear states on risk reduction measures is the inability of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to negotiate low-hanging fruits like Negative Security Assurances (NSA).
In case of South Asia, forcing India, Pakistan and China together would only complicate the measures for nuclear risk reduction in the region and beyond. This is also true for all other strategic trilemmas like the United States, China, and Russia. Scholars of nuclear strategy play an important role in shaping the cognitive mindset of policymakers. Instead of increasing difficulties, scholars should find ways that can provide a path to risk reduction measures. In conclusion, the concept of Strategic trilemma is not the right way forward for understanding the region.
Abdul Moiz Khan works as Research Officer at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad.
