Introduction
Recent reports and analyses regarding Pakistan’s ballistic missile developments have raised concerns about Islamabad’s potential pursuit of intercontinental-range capabilities. These concerns stem largely from State-generated information with political motivations, so-called open-source intelligence, speculative interpretations of satellite imagery, and allegations of foreign assistance—primarily from China. Some assessments suggest that Pakistan’s alleged acquisition of advanced composite materials and the construction of new testing facilities indicate an ambition to extend its missile range well beyond South Asia.
However, such claims lack evidentiary grounding and ignore Pakistan’s doctrinal clarity on deterrence. Unlike India, which has explicitly framed its missile expansion in terms of regional and extra-regional power projection, Pakistan has consistently maintained that its nuclear and missile programs are intended solely for deterrence stability against India. This position has been articulated in National Command Authority statements, government and military pronouncements [(Government of Pakistan, “National Command Authority Statement,” 2022, https://www.ispr.gov.pk)].
While Pakistan’s technological advancements are scrutinized, India’s rapid missile development—enabled by Western and Russian assistance—faces little to no international opposition. If concerns about proliferation and strategic stability in South Asia are genuine, then the focus should be on India’s growing arsenal rather than Pakistan’s defensive posture.
Pakistan’s Strategic Doctrine: An India-Centric Approach
Pakistan’s missile and nuclear deterrence posture is explicitly India-focused. This doctrinal clarity has been reaffirmed in every major policy statement issued by its leadership, including in NCA decisions and statements, parliamentary debates, and statements from the Strategic Plans Division though Inter-services Public Relations Directorate.
Pakistan’s strategic doctrine is built around three key principles. One, ensuring that India’s expanding conventional and nuclear forces do not undermine regional stability. Two, developing capabilities only necessary to counter Indian threats, without engaging in unnecessary arms races. Lastly, maintaining a Full-Spectrum Deterrence to dissuade Indian military adventurisms that inter alia seek space for limited war under nuclear overhang[(Government of Pakistan, “Strategic Plans Division Statement on Deterrence Policy,” 2023, https://www.spd.gov.pk)].
Despite this, Western analysts have persistently misrepresented Pakistan’s missile developments as an indicator of ambitions beyond South Asia. This analysis ignores a critical regional reality. States in Pakistan’s vicinity possess long-range missile capabilities that could target it. Despite this, Pakistan has never framed its missile development in terms of threats from these States. Unlike India, Pakistan does not seek regional hegemony, nor does it possess doctrines for power projection beyond South Asia. The argument that Pakistan is developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability is both analytically flawed and strategically misleading.
Material Advancements: A Logical Step for Efficiency, Not Extended Ranges
Recent allegations that Pakistan may be developing ICBMs and is acquiring composite materials such as D-glass fiber and quartz fabric are interesting. These materials, used in solid rocket motors, reduce missile weight and improve structural integrity. However, the assumption that these materials are being used to develop ICBMs is deeply flawed.
These are technological adaptations, not expansion. Composite materials are a natural evolution in modern missile technology. They enhance efficiency rather than automatically extending range. Missile weight reduction improves maneuverability and payload capacity, particularly for medium-range ballistic missiles.
On comparison, India has already incorporated similar materials into its Agni-V ICBM, leading to a 20% reduction in weight and an increased range from 5,400 km to over 7,000 km [(Indian Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), “Agni-V Technical Report,” 2018, https://www.drdo.gov.in)]. India’s longer range ICBMs, PSLVs and SLVs have also benefited from similar technological proliferation. Despite this, India’s use of composite materials has not been cited as a proliferation concern, which explains the Western political bias.
Pakistan’s Focus on Existing Capabilities
Pakistan’s longest-range missile, Shaheen-III is barely sufficient to cover all major Indian targets but not beyond. It does not fully cover Andaman and Nicobar Islands. No new Pakistani missile system has been tested or declared with a range beyond this limit.
If Pakistan were seeking ICBM capability, it would require significant infrastructure changes, which have not been observed in any analysis [(International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Pakistan’s Missile Developments,” 2024, https://www.iiss.org)]. Even a cursory examination of Indian missile and space program will clearly show the Western proliferation of technology to India. In short, the technological rationale behind Pakistan’s missile improvements aligns with established deterrence needs.
Misinterpreted Assistances
A recurring theme in Western assessments of Pakistan’s missile program is the allegation that China has supplied key missile technologies, violating global non-proliferation norms. China and Pakistan have denied the allegations, with Beijing reaffirming that its defense cooperation adheres to international regulations [(Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement on Defense Trade with Pakistan,” 2024, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn)]. Pakistan has developed an indigenous missile production base over the past three decades, reducing reliance on foreign technology.
West has generated these concerns to justify sanctions against Pakistani and Chinese entities under the U.S. Missile Sanctions Act [(U.S. Department of State, “Sanctions on Missile Technology Transfers,” 2024, https://www.state.gov)]. However, this narrative selectively ignores the far greater proliferation of missile and space technology to India, which has facilitated New Delhi’s rapid missile expansion.
For instance, the U.S., Israel and France have provided India with dual-use space launch technology, enabling the development of advanced guidance systems for ballistic missiles [(U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Defense Technology Transfers to India,” 2022, https://www.crsreports.congress.gov)]. French assistance in solid-fuel technology for long-range missiles. Israeli cooperation in ballistic missile defense and satellite tracking [(Israeli Ministry of Defense, “India-Israel Missile Collaboration,” 2023, https://www.mod.gov.il)]. American provision of dual-use technologies, including advanced navigation and guidance systems [(U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Defense Technology Transfers to India,” 2022, https://www.crsreports.congress.gov)].
There are double standards followed in the so-called non-proliferation regime created by the West after World War-II. Western non-proliferation policies have applied a permissive approach to India while maintaining restrictions on Pakistan, despite both being non-NPT nuclear-armed states. A clear example of this is India’s admission to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 2016, which has facilitated its access to dual-use space launch and missile technologies [(A.A. Khan, “Indian Nuclear Exceptionalism and South Asian Strategic Stability,” CISS Insight, 2022, http://www.journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/229)].
India’s inclusion in MTCR has eased restrictions on its access to long-range missile technology, whereas Pakistan is being constrained. Through MTCR membership, India has been able to acquire high-end rocket motors, propulsion systems, and guidance technologies—many of which have applications in both civilian space and ballistic missile programs.
While China’s defense cooperation with Pakistan is frequently scrutinized, India has received far greater external assistance in missile and space technologies from multiple sources. Russia has supplied India’s DRDO with crucial rocket motor technology, directly aiding the Agni series ballistic missile program [(Russian Federation Defense Ministry, “India-Russia Defense Cooperation Report,” 2022, https://www.mid.ru)]. This partnership has enabled India to develop solid-fuel missile propulsion, crucial for even ICBMs like Surya and Agni-VI. The Agni-VI program, designed to extend its reach up to 12,000 km, faces no opposition from Western non-proliferation circles.
India has already operationalized an intercontinental-range missile, the Agni-V, with an range of over 8,000 km. Further, India is actively developing the Agni-VI, projected to have a range of up to 12,000 km [(Indian Defence Research & Development Organisation, “Agni-VI Development Report,” 2023, https://www.drdo.gov.in)]. Unlike Pakistan, whose Shaheen-III is capped within Pak-India Subcontinent, India’s missile trajectory extends well beyond the region. India has publicly stated that these missiles are intended for countering China, but their range brings other global targets within reach.
Despite this, India’s ICBM development has not resulted in Western sanctions or arms control measures. India has successfully developed multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) technology, allowing a single missile to carry multiple nuclear warheads, enhancing its first-strike capabilities [(U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “India’s Missile Modernization,” 2022, https://www.dia.mil)]. The Agni-P missile, tested in 2021, was explicitly designed for MIRV deployment [(International Institute for Strategic Studies, “India’s Emerging MIRV Capabilities,” 2023, https://www.iiss.org)]. India’s development of K-4 and K-5 SLBMs aims to establish a second-strike capability, further consolidating its nuclear triad [(Indian Navy Report on SLBM Program, 2023, https://www.indiannavy.gov.in)].
While Pakistan faces scrutiny for testing short-range cruise missiles, India has conducted multiple long-range missile tests with no international pushback. Satellite imagery and intelligence assessments confirm that India now possesses the third-largest nuclear-capable missile arsenal in the world [(Zahir Kazmi, “Challenges of Strategic Stability Amongst Littoral Powers of the Indian Ocean Region,” CISS Insight, 2023, http://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/345)].
India has received Israeli assistance in radar, guidance, and tracking systems for its ballistic missile defense program [(Israeli Ministry of Defense, “India-Israel Missile Collaboration,” 2023, https://www.mod.gov.il)]. This has enhanced India’s ability to field MIRVs, a capability Pakistan is accused of pursuing despite having no comparable technological support.
Why Pakistan Faces a Different Standard
A major contradiction in Western strategic assessments is the unequal treatment of India and Pakistan regarding missile proliferation. As explained above, India has received unrestricted access to missile technology from multiple countries, including Russian collaboration on Agni propulsion systems. Pakistan, on the other hand, has faced systematic restrictions, making its deterrence development far more arduous. It has been a target of global technology-sharing frameworks like the MTCR dedspite adhering to its export control lists and providing transparency.
Unlike India, Pakistan has no strategic partnerships that allow direct access to advanced missile technology. Any technological acquisition—no matter how minor—is flagged as a proliferation concern. This technological exlcusivity is a deliberate policy aimed at reinforcing India’s strategic dominance in South Asia, rather than promoting genuine non-proliferation.
Pakistan has built an indigenous missile industry, reducing reliance on foreign suppliers. Unlike India, it has not received strategic technology transfers from major powers [(A.A. Abid, “The Efficacy of Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence,” CISS Insight, 2023, http://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/245)].
While India regularly tests long-range ballistic missiles, any Pakistani missile development—no matter how defensive—is framed as destabilizing [(S. Iqbal & M.K. Mehdi, “Rising Hindutva’s Impact on Strategic Stability in South Asia,” CISS Insight, 2022, http://journal.ciss.org.pk/index.php/ciss-insight/article/view/231)]. The strategic bias in Western assessments is further reinforced by the Indo-Pacific strategy, which positions India as a counterweight to China and seeks to limit Pakistan’s strategic autonomy. Despite these well-documented proliferation of missiles and space technologies, India faces no comparable scrutiny or sanctions [(U.S. Congressional Research Service, “Defense Exports to India,” 2023, https://www.crsreports.congress.gov)}.
Pakistan’s missile developments must also be examined within the broader context of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy. This policy aims to position India as a counterweight to China, leading to a structural bias in how regional security issues are assessed [(U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov)}. India is being promoted as a “Net Security Provider” in the Indian Ocean, with Pakistan being pushed into a subordinate regional role.
Indian-origin policymakers in Western strategic circles have reinforced a narrative that aligns U.S. interests with New Delhi’s perspectives. Pakistan’s deterrence efforts are viewed as an impediment to India’s regional dominance, leading to unfair restrictions on its missile development.
This geopolitical bias explains why Pakistan faces greater scrutiny than India, despite having a more defensive missile posture. While concerns are repeatedly raised about Pakistan’s missile capabilities, India’s rapid advancements in missile technology—driven by foreign assistance—are largely overlooked.
Despite the overwhelming evidence of Western and Russian assistance to India’s missile program, Pakistan is subjected to restrictive policies that hinder its ability to maintain deterrence stability. Western policies reinforce an artificial strategic imbalance, favoring India while attempting to limit Pakistan’s deterrence capabilities.
U.S. Sanctions and Their Counterproductive Impact
In December 2024, the U.S. Department of State imposed sanctions on four Pakistani entities, including the National Defence Complex, citing concerns over ballistic missile development [(U.S. Department of State, “Pakistan Missile Sanctions,” 2024, https://www.state.gov)]. However, these sanctions exacerbate strategic asymmetry in the region, making South Asia less stable, not more. These will push Pakistan toward alternative alliances rather than curbing technological development. These fail to address the real proliferation challenge—India’s expanding missile arsenal, which faces no comparable restrictions.
If stability in South Asia is the real objective, the so-called non-proliferation policies must be re-evaluated to ensure they are applied equitably rather than selectively weaponized against Pakistan. A balanced non-proliferation approach is necessary, rather than one designed to enforce strategic disparities.
Conclusion
The persistent mischaracterization of Pakistan’s missile program stems from geopolitical biases rather than factual analysis. Pakistan is not developing ICBMs, nor does it have a strategic rationale to do so. Pakistan’s missile advancements remain India-centric and are explicitly framed within deterrence doctrine. The focus of Western scrutiny should be on India’s expanding missile program, which has far greater regional and global implications. Current U.S. policies, driven by the Indo-Pacific strategy, artificially tilt the strategic balance in India’s favor.
If Western policymakers are genuinely concerned with regional stability, they must adopt a more balanced approach that holds all regional actors accountable. Selective proliferation concerns that single out Pakistan while empowering India risk undermining the very stability that global non-proliferation efforts claim to uphold.
References
- Government of Pakistan. “National Command Authority Statement.” 2022. https://www.ispr.gov.pk.
- Government of Pakistan. “Strategic Plans Division Statement on Deterrence Policy.” 2023. https://www.spd.gov.pk.
- Indian Defence Research & Development Organisation. “Agni-V Technical Report.” 2018. https://www.drdo.gov.in.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Pakistan’s Missile Developments.” 2024. https://www.iiss.org.
- U.S. Department of State. “Sanctions on Missile Technology Transfers.” 2024. https://www.state.gov.
- Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Statement on Defense Trade with Pakistan.” 2024. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn.
- Russian Federation Defense Ministry. “India-Russia Defense Cooperation Report.” 2022. https://www.mid.ru.
- Israeli Ministry of Defense. “India-Israel Strategic Cooperation.” 2023. https://www.mod.gov.il.
- U.S. Congressional Research Service. “Defense Exports to India.” 2023. https://www.crsreports.congress.gov.
- U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy Report. 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov.
- U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. “India’s Missile Modernization.” 2022. https://www.dia.mil.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. “India’s Emerging MIRV Capabilities.” 2023. https://www.iiss.org.
- Indian Navy. “SLBM Program Report.” 2023. https://www.indiannavy.gov.in.
