India’s recent cross-border strikes under Operation Sindoor, and the attempt to reframe them as a new counter-terrorism doctrine, may excite hawks and domestic audiences. But beneath the surface, this shift marks a dangerous deviation from established norms of state behavior and strategic prudence.
In his commentary on the operation, Indian analyst Happymon Jacob describes a confident India that is “done with strategic restraint” and now willing to strike at will. But this interpretation masks a troubling escalation pattern rooted in unverified claims, legal distortions, and a misreading of nuclear deterrence dynamics. Sindoor does not signify strategic clarity; it exemplifies reckless overreach.

False Flags and Manufactured Pretexts
The April 22 incident in Pahalgam — a remote and highly secured area — was swiftly blamed on Pakistan. Attribution preceded any investigation. Within hours, airstrikes followed. This is not unfamiliar territory.
India has a documented history of leveraging ambiguous crises as casus belli. The 1995 Al-Faran kidnappings, explored in Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark’s The Meadow, raised serious concerns about internal orchestration. More recently, Pulwama (2019) and Pathankot (2016) showed how attribution can become a tool of narrative, not a product of evidence.
India’s bypassing of multilateral mechanisms, such as joint investigations or diplomatic protest via the Indus Waters Treaty framework, reinforces this pattern. “Act first, justify later” is a dangerous doctrine — and one that sets troubling precedents for other nuclear-armed regions.
Weaponizing Self-Defence: Legal Myopia
India claims its strikes are justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter — the right to self-defence. But international law demands that such force meet strict tests: necessity, immediacy, and proportionality.
None of these thresholds were met. There was no imminent threat; no necessity that could not be addressed through diplomacy; and certainly no proportionality in targeting civilian infrastructure, such as the Neelum–Jhelum Hydropower Project — a site protected under Article 56 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions.
Normalizing pre-emptive force on the basis of perceived terrorist threats risks rendering the international legal order moot. Were Pakistan to follow such doctrine, it would be justified in targeting RSS-linked infrastructure following attacks like the Jaffar Express bombing in Balochistan. Would India and its partners find such logic acceptable?
A Doctrine of Precedents, Not Principles
Operation Sindoor appears to be part of a carefully sequenced doctrine of escalation:
1    Trigger a crisis, typically with unverifiable attacks.
2    Impute blame to Pakistan without presenting actionable evidence.
3    Conduct military strikes, including in disputed or sovereign Pakistani territory.
4    Invoke self-defence, side-stepping international scrutiny.
5    Claim restraint, even as strategic norms are eroded.
This is not a doctrine of deterrence — it is a doctrine of manipulation. It seeks to redefine rules of engagement not through international consensus, but by setting de facto precedents. For New Delhi, being judge, jury, and executioner in such crises creates temporary tactical advantage. But this short-term gain masks long-term strategic peril.
Deterrence Misunderstood
One of Jacob’s most problematic assertions is that India has “called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.” This interpretation dangerously misreads the function of deterrence. Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) doctrine is calibrated. As Pakistan’s response during 2019 Kashmir crisis affirmed, FSD’s strength lies in ensuring that India’s ambitions to wage limited war do not succeed. Pakistan’s restraint following provocations is a mark of discipline, not weakness.
India’s repeated escalations have not gone unanswered. After Pulwama, Pakistan’s Quid Pro Quo Plus (QPQ+) response — downing Indian aircraft and capturing a pilot — proved its resolve. That similar actions have not yet followed Sindoor does not suggest absence of will, but the presence of strategic calculation.
The notion that deterrence has failed because it has not produced war is not only paradoxical — it is dangerous.
Why the World Should Be Concerned
Jacob frames Sindoor as a moment of choice for the international community: stand with India or lose relevance in Delhi. This is not diplomacy — it is coercion. The implication is clear: criticism of India’s methods is tantamount to sympathizing with terrorism.
This absolutism is antithetical to international norms. If Sindoor is accepted as a precedent, other states may follow suit, citing unverified threats to justify force. The erosion of norms will not end at the Line of Control. It will travel globally.
The fact that Israeli drones were used in some of these strikes also introduces a dangerous geopolitical layer — the blending of external technologies and domestic narratives to justify escalation. This globalizes what has traditionally been seen as a bilateral issue, and invites international entanglement in regional conflicts.
Pakistan’s Posture: Measured, Not Passive
Pakistan’s doctrine has never precluded response. It chooses its timing with care, not because of weakness, but because of its responsibility as a nuclear state. A visible, proportionate response may yet come — calibrated to restore balance without crossing escalation thresholds.

Unlike India, Pakistan has no interest in turning military retaliation into media spectacle. But no doctrine can succeed indefinitely if provocation becomes policy. The strategic space for Pakistan’s response remains open — and may soon be tested.
Conclusion: The Folly of Sindoor
Operation Sindoor is not a new doctrine — it is an old mistake repackaged. It is the belief that short-term tactical aggression can deliver long-term strategic security. History, both regional and global, shows otherwise.
If India truly seeks peace and recognition as a responsible power, it must abandon this playbook of coercion. Power is not measured by the distance of a strike, but by the wisdom of restraint. Strategic maturity lies not in military adventurism, but in resolving disputes that fuel perpetual crisis.
For Pakistan, the lesson is simple: restraint is strength — but restraint must not become irrelevance. And for the world: don’t mistake silence for surrender. The region’s stability depends on rejecting doctrines like Sindoor before they become global norms.
India’s incursions have so far been absorbed by Pakistan — but to assume this restraint is infinite is a miscalculation. The absence of nuclear use in past crises does not invalidate deterrence; it confirms that escalation was, so far, contained.
Deterrence is about credibility — and credibility is not performative. The fact that Pakistan has not responded overtly yet does not mean it will always choose not to. The strategic space remains open — and time, not politics, may determine the moment of reply.

Meanwhile, it’s India’s choice to pull off such stunts every few years, if it’s fine with a price tag of nearly a billion dollar per strike and it’s reputation as a nuclear-armed Hindutva driven state that is bent on pushing South Asia and world towards chaos.

The views expressed herein are the author’s personal opinions and do not reflect the official policy or stance of any organization.

Author

The author is the Arms Control Advisor, SPD.