In 2018, the Indian Army released its updated Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD), an advanced military strategy that reflects the service’s shift from a reactive and defensive posture to a more proactive, offensive, and limited war approach, especially toward Pakistan. The doctrine aims to create operational space for punitive actions under the nuclear threshold, harnessing emerging technologies and rapid mobilization of its military force to conduct short-duration, high-intensity engagements that do not escalate into full-scale war.
The central tenet of the doctrine is Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs), which are self-contained, mobile strike formations designed for limited, shallow incursions with specific, but limited objectives. The LWD puts increased emphasis on “jointness” between tri-services, as well as the integration of cyber and space domains. Above all, it seems to favor a networked, precision approach to warfare, which aims to deter and eventually dominate Pakistan in the case of any future conflict.
The doctrine signifies India’s desire to change the threshold of regional conflict below the nuclear dimension, with its neighbor Pakistan. At its core, the doctrine signals a desire to engage in limited conflict without the restrictions usually associated with nuclear deterrence. It envisages that India could undertake limited warfare, while signaling to its audiences (both domestic and international) that it is a strong country that can do whatever it wants without being held accountable.
From Balakot to Sindoor: Doctrinal Evolution and India’s Miscalculations
India’s initial effort to operationalize its evolving military doctrine was through the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). However, CSD failed to materialize due to structural, logistical, and political constraints. As a result, India shifted towards a more refined approach in the form of the Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) of 2018. The first real attempt to put LWD into action came in February 2019, during the Balakot airstrikes that followed the Pulwama incident. That episode, however, demonstrated India’s doctrinal immaturity. On display was a limited precision strike capability, a lack of real-time ISR, and poor coordination among the services. Pakistan immediately restored deterrence by shooting down Indian aircrafts and capturing the pilot. The outcome embarrassed the Modi regime domestically and internationally.
By May 2025, India was aware of those limitations and improved its operational plans to overcome these challenges. In Operation Sindoor, it came with full doctrinal and technological readiness. India deployed its French Rafale jets equipped with BVR missiles, operationalized the S-400 and Barak-8 air defense systems, deployed Israeli drones, and launched BrahMos missiles inside Pakistan. New Delhi aimed to dominate the aerial battlespace, strike Pakistani targets from standoff ranges, and achieve military and psychological superiority without crossing the international border. The presumption was to embarrass Pakistan which is entangled in economic, and sociopolitical challenges, and would absorb the strikes within response. New Delhi perhaps reasoned in retrospect that it could control the escalation ladder, and in doing so it would change the norms of limited conflict in South Asia.
But the miscalculation was serious. Pakistan’s response was much stronger than expected. In less than 36 hours, Pakistan retaliated against 26 Indian military sites, striking deep into the Indian side of the border. Reports suggest that Pakistan specifically targeted components of India’s layered air defense system, including the S-400, signifying a new level of boldness for Pakistan’s conventional forces. Despite facing significant economic challenges, Pakistan’s military and political leadership has reasserted conventional deterrence and preserved an uneasy equilibrium in the region.
The New Normal: India’s Attempt to Redefine Escalation Dynamics with Pakistan
India’s doctrine-driven posture seeks to normalize limited conflict as a viable and recurring policy tool, with strategic benefits and minimal costs. It reflects an effort to keep Pakistan engaged conventionally, stretch its defenses across multiple fronts, and create a perpetual threat environment that reduces Pakistan’s space to maneuver, both diplomatically and militarily.
India’s doctrine is effectively attempting to entangle Pakistan into a cycle of conventional engagement, with an intent to weaken its nuclear deterrence posture by proving that not every engagement warrants escalation to strategic levels. This is not limited to airstrikes; future iterations could well see multi-pronged land incursions by IBGs, naval provocations, and gray-zone operations in the disputed territories. Pakistan’s traditional threat from the east has evolved into a multi-front challenge. It may be noted that India has previously used Afghan soil to destabilize Pakistan, turning conventional rivalry into hybrid confrontation.
Pakistan has taken important steps to counter India’s evolving military posture, but to meet future challenges effectively, much more needs to be done. The country must shift from a reactive stance to a proactive and long-term strategic framework. This entails deeper investment, better integration across several domains:
Pakistan’s air defenses performed well in the recent conflict, intercepting key threats and demonstrating readiness. However, future threats demand further qualitative upgrades, especially against stand-off and swarm attacks. At the same time, Pakistan must enhance its indigenous long-range precision strike capabilities to ensure credible and flexible response options.
Next, with non-kinetic warfare gaining ground, Pakistan has strong electronic warfare and cyberspace capabilities to counter India’s tech edge. Nevertheless, it must continue to invest in these capabilities more as countering adversary electronic capabilities, through effective electronic countermeasures and offensive cyber tools, will be essential to degrade preemptively and during conflict.
The third point is that Pakistan’s armed forces must continue the already regular joint military exercises simulating limited-war scenarios. This would enable the armed forces to achieve greater interoperability and tactical coherence. Besides, these exercises must not be designed solely to respond to the kind of conventional incursions the army has dealt with in the past. They must also prepare the army, navy, and air force to counter the kind of multi-domain threats the current character of conflict—which India’s doctrine envisions.
Moreover, Pakistan must continue to evolve its military strategy, one that integrates both conventional and strategic elements to deter adversaries. Additionally, Pakistan’s diplomacy needs to be more assertive and preemptive. It is crucial to highlight India’s shift in doctrine on multilateral platforms—and especially in the media—to ensure that any escalation is viewed in its complete context.
The Land Warfare Doctrine of India has undergone a profound change, reflecting a significant evolution of its ideas about the use of force, especially in a nuclear South Asian environment. It is all about coercion and intimidation, and a doctrine that failed in May 2025 to establish a new normal in South Asia.
Syed Ali Abbas is research officer at Center for International strategic studies Islamabad
