On May 11, 1998, the Indian government, then under PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee, proceeded to conduct tests ( codenamed Operation Shakti) of their nuclear devices at the remote site of Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert. These tests were not the first. Back in 1974, India had conducted nuclear weapons codenamed “Smiling Buddha” nuclear test at the same site. The 1998 tests, however, were meant to signal India’s aggressive posture in South Asia and perturb the delicate balance of regional security. But what followed was Pakistan’s response on 28th and 30th May, when it detonated nuclear devices—officially marking itself as the second South Asian state with nuclear weapons. Pakistan going nuclear meant that India’s desire to circumscribe its neighbour was kept in check. Sabre-rattling against Pakistan would now come with a cost—a nuclear cost—a cost India could never afford if it desired to strangulate Pakistan.
From 1998 to 2025, much has changed. Total war has been avoided, and Pakistan has walked the tightrope of balancing strategic stability in South Asia. India’s aggressive posturing has evolved: from all-out invasion to the Cold Start doctrine, then to surgical strikes, and more recently to employing stand-off weapons—albeit in a reckless and destabilizing manner—against Pakistan. Although India introduced nukes in South Asia, it could not fulfill the hegemonic overhang it envisaged. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent has so far kept its territorial integrity intact and kept India’s superiority complex in check.
India’s irrational behaviour after the recent Pahalgam episode and its brazenness in attacking Pakistan’s mainland, followed by reckless strikes on Pakistan’s military infrastructure—all the while seeking a ceasefire—raises serious questions about its strategic responsibilities.
Ironically, what India desired to establish on 11th May 1998 was matched on 28th May, and what it sought to establish on 7th May 2025 was countered on 10th May 2025. Instead of coming to terms with reality, Indian leadership maintained its jingoistic triumphalism for its domestic audience. It still has not been able to sell its “ceasefire “to the public at large. India was humbled, tactically and technologically, yet its political elites claim that their operation is still in progress. No doubt they are scathed, vying for revenge. In doing so, they are even debasing the U.S.-mediated ceasefire. Their fake news on nuclear issues is another serious concern. If India lacks strategic sense in the conventional military domain, is its nuclear domain untouched? These questions worry regional actors, but should also worry those who were betting on India as a counterweight to China and a net security provider in the region—only to see it hyphenated again with a “smaller” Pakistan. Not good optics for a country that called itself a pole and touted its “strategic autonomy.”
Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit—or, if one may call it, the “small man’s bomb”—has been the bulwark against a hegemonic desire that strives to dismember it again. The sub-conventional war doctrine, or the Doval Doctrine, or the so-called “offensive defence,” was symptomatic of two things: destabilizing Pakistan below the nuclear threshold and the continuity of support for centrifugal elements within Pakistan. The latter meant taking advantage of religious, sectarian, and ethnic fault lines in Pakistan. But that policy has failed so far because Pakistan has not only symbolized a high tolerance level against proxy warfare but has even managed to contain the attempts to instigate. Furthermore, despite shortcomings in counter-terror approaches, Pakistan has not taken kinetic actions against India. India, otherwise, despite being so large, has a fragile pain threshold. It acts irrationally—or rather ideologically. Its knee-jerk reactions nearly led to an all-out war last month which was averted due to international intervention. Its strategic sense muddled when it lowered the threshold of engagement. India still has not caught Pahalgam perpetrators, who are still at large after carrying out the attack in occupied Kashmir which is most militarized zone in South Asia. But India proceeded to bring South Asia to the brink of a serious conflict, possibly a nuclear one.
It is no hidden fact that India has been swerving since Pakistan’s nuclear test to form a cushion for conventional engagement below the nuclear threshold. Initially, it might have been a tactical idea, but with the BJP’s ideological overhang, there is little rationality and more tendency for brinkmanship for domestic political compulsions—be it elections, pumping a strongman (Vishwa Guru) image, or simply bullying a smaller country to portray itself as a “big” power.
The May of 1998 reverberates to this day. For Pakistan, it was a watershed moment to close the window of any all-out war. For India, it was a crash landing to reality—that its desire for warring in South Asia has gone down a deep ravine. Afterwards, whether it was Cold Start doctrines, surgical strikes, or stand-off engagements, the escalation levels have gone down, contrary to what India desired.
This should explain that Pakistan’s nuclear pursuit—despite certain powers being against it—was very much an existential compulsion. History has simply attested to this. India being hyphenated into the Indo-Pak equation once again has simply unveiled the reality for what it is. It was never Sino-Indian competition, no matter how much India’s strategic thinkers try to spin it. India’s strategic purview has and will revolve around Pakistan.
It would be fraught to think that India simply seeks a space for conventional war. Its tactical minds are very much aware of the nuclear risks attached to their misadventures. It is a deliberate effort to spur nuclear response—or even initiate a nuclear conflict. The recent conflict has shown one thing: that things can escalate very quickly—particularly due to India’s desire to bait the Pakistani Air Force after getting its aircraft shot down on the night of 6-7th May. The next round would see weapons that can destabilize things in a short duration, closing the window for third-party involvement or even domestic sense to prevail. This does not augur well for South Asian peace—the prospects of which have been diminished by India’s high-stakes impulsivity, which in turn disincentivizes the side showing strategic prudence.
Summing it up, the events of May 1998 have paid dividends in 2025. From the Newtonian moniker, action had an equal reaction. India’s five tests were met with six Pakistani tests. And in May 2025, India lost six aircraft and received a volley of rockets two days after its recklessness in attacking Pakistani airbases and civilian centres. The world has observed—hence it has not subscribed to Indian talking points. They would also understand that this matter is not just about Kashmir. Pakistan shares a border with a country six times its size, ten times its economy, and a military twice as big—with the unwanted add-on of erratic strategic behavior.
About the Author:
Hammad Waleed is a Research Associate at Strategic Vision Institute Islamabad . He is a part of the Emerging Technologies and Peaceful Nuclear Uses Team. He writes of issues pertaining Strategic stability, Intersection of Technologies on National Security and Conflicts. He can be reached on @hammadwaleed82@gmail.com
