Since 1947, Pakistan has perceived its eastern neighbor, India, as a fundamental existential threat. This perception was further amplified following India’s Pokhran-I nuclear test in 1974 – officially termed a “peaceful nuclear explosion” – which heightened Pakistan’s strategic anxieties about the potential vulnerability of its territorial integrity. In response, for survival, Pakistan’s leadership, underpinned by a strong political will, mobilized the state apparatus and engaged all key stakeholders to navigate the path toward nuclear deterrence, one clearly oriented around the Indian threat. This strategic pursuit was far from unencumbered; Pakistan faced a barrage series of international sanctions, sustained political pressures and diplomatic isolation. Nevertheless, Pakistan conducted its nuclear tests in 1998 with strategic resilience, adopting a policy of restraint and norm compliance. Today, Pakistan’s nuclear program remains its security guarantor against Indian threats and aggression in the region.
Fast forward to 18 December 2024, the Biden administration imposed sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile programme under Executive Order 13382. These measures marked a further deterioration in an already tenuous bilateral relationship. The imposition of sanctions appeared not only as a punitive measure but also as a strategic signal – intended, perhaps, to constrain the incoming Trump administration’s latitude in re-engaging with Pakistan. This approach aligned with Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which clearly navigated its convergence of interest with India to counterbalance the rising power, China. At a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace forum, U.S. Principal Deputy National Security Advisor Jonathan Finer alleged that Pakistan was developing long-range ballistic missile capabilities “to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States.” He further asserted that Pakistan’s development of large-diameter solid rocket motors was “fundamentally focused on the U.S.” The timing of these sanctions is particularly important, coinciding with a transitional moment in US domestic politics.
However, such assertions contradict Pakistan’s strategic doctrine which remains firmly India-centric and is grounded in the principle of credible minimum deterrence. Over time, this posture evolved into full-spectrum deterrence strategy – unambiguously calibrated in response to the India’s conventional and unconventional capabilities and ambitions. Pakistan’s nuclear posture is inherently defensive in nature and driven by a regional security dilemma rather than global strategic ambitions. There is no empirical or doctrinal basis to suggest that Pakistan has broadened its threat calculus beyond South Asia or adopted an interregional targeting strategy.
In contrast, India’s missile development program is significantly more expansive and outward-looking. Pakistan’s longest-range missile, the Shaheen-III, with a range of 2,750 km, was explicitly developed to ensure full territorial coverage of India, nothing beyond. Pakistan has consistently refrained from pursuing missile capabilities that exceed its defined security requirements. India, on the other hand, has tested the Agni-V and is reportedly developing the Agni-VI, both with intercontinental range capabilities capable of striking targets far beyond South Asia. India’s establishment of overseas military facilities in countries such as Mauritius, Tajikistan, and Oman further underscores its strategic ambitions beyond the region. Coupled with its rapid military modernization, particularly in emerging technologies, India’s strategic trajectory presents a more credible case of regional power projection and missile proliferation. In this context, Pakistan’s commitment to credible deterrence remains proportionate and defensive. The genuine risk of long-range missile proliferation in South Asia stems not from Pakistan, but from India’s increasingly assertive strategic posture.
Overlooking all of Pakistan’s responsible efforts to ensure non-proliferation, the speculation regarding its nuclear program, based on “U.S. intelligence”, serves more as a political tool. It potentially targets Pakistan’s longstanding strategic calculus. Pakistan is not new to such roadblocks; it has confronted similar challenges for decades. Despite sanctions, Pakistan has maintained its nuclear program. However, this is the first time the U.S. has directly targeted key government institutions such as the National Development Complex (NDC), Akhtar and Sons Private Limited, Affiliates International, and Rockside Enterprise. The U.S. alleges that the NDC is responsible for developing the Shaheen-series missiles. Pakistan’s Foreign Office has called this move “biased and unfortunate”, stating that the U.S. is undermining regional security by increasing military asymmetries. These sanctions not only weaken the integrity of non-proliferation regimes but also jeopardize regional stability.
Unfortunately, in May 2025, five months after the sanctions, India and Pakistan engaged in a four-day multi-domain conflict. Following the ceasefire, U.S. President Donald Trump extended an unprecedented invitation to Pakistan’s Field Marshal Asim Munir for a high-profile luncheon at the White House. This meeting marked a significant diplomatic milestone and conveyed a strong strategic signal under challenging circumstances. It affirmed Pakistan’s standing as a pivotal strategic actor in South Asia. Despite periodic downturns, Pakistan has maintained a complex yet enduring strategic relationship with the United States. Under the Trump administration, bilateral ties are showing signs of renewed engagement. Moving forward, Pakistan seeks to carefully balance its relations with both China and the United States to secure long-term strategic and economic gains. Leadership will play a critical role in navigating this balancing act. Despite Washington’s deepening strategic partnership with India, Pakistan has managed to carve out its own strategic space, opening the door for enhanced engagement with the U.S. based on shared interests and mutual respect.
In this context, the timing of the article “How to Survive the New Nuclear Age” by Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, published in Foreign Affairs, is notable. The piece, released just six days after Field Marshal Asim Munir’s meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump, mischaracterizes Pakistan as an “emerging threat” and suggests it is developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of targeting the United States. Such claims warrant scrutiny. It is essential to critically examine the indicators upon which these assertions are based, are they grounded in verifiable intelligence, or are they speculative interpretations shaped by strategic bias? Discourse lacking in evidentiary rigor risks undermining future Pakistan-U.S. relations and contributes to misinformed narratives. More importantly, such claims disregard the fundamental tenets of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, which remains regionally focused and built around credible minimum deterrence.
Second, one must ask: what is the strategic intent behind bringing this matter to the forefront? Is it an attempt to sideline Pakistan from the global strategic discourse? If so, the realities on the ground contradict such a narrative. First, Pakistan’s critical role in counterterrorism has been publicly acknowledged by U.S. Central Command Chief General Michael Erik Kurilla, who emphasized the importance of strengthening ties with Pakistan. Second, Pakistan was elected Vice-Chair of the UN Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and Chair of the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee for 2025, clear indicators of international trust in its counterterrorism credentials. Third, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has not returned Pakistan to the grey list, reflecting confidence in its financial regulatory reforms. Following the Pahalgam incident, India sought to diplomatically isolate Pakistan by invoking the terrorism narrative to justify its actions, including cross-border strikes. Yet, Pakistan navigated the crisis diplomatically and emerged with credibility intact. Fourth, Pakistan assumed the presidency of the United Nations Security Council, an affirmation of its global diplomatic standing. As a responsible and engaged member of the UN, Pakistan remains committed to constructive collaboration with fellow Council members.
Given the prevailing geopolitical dynamics in South Asia, it is essential to recognize that Pakistan’s nuclear posture is deeply rooted in regional security imperatives, primarily stemming from the enduring threat perception vis-à-vis India. In this context, the region urgently requires transparent and sustained diplomatic engagement to curb the rise of rhetoric and conjecture that unjustly casts Pakistan “Proliferation threat of long range missile development.” A policy of strategic balance remains the most viable approach for South Asia, where the foremost priority is the responsible management of nuclear risks and the maintenance of regional stability.
Author
Adeela Ahmed, PhD Candidate IR School of Integrated Social Science, University of Lahore, Research Fellow Center for Security, Strategy and Policy Research (CSSPR), University of Lahore, Lahore Pakistan. Non Resident Research Fellow Eurasian Century Institute (ECI) Islamabad.
