THE Indian Atomic Energy Commission was established in 1948 to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
While introducing the legislation of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru hinted at the intention to develop nuclear weapons, asserting that, “I think we must develop it for peaceful purposes; however, if we are compelled to use it for other purposes, we would go for it.” Still, Indian domestic infrastructure was not capable of supporting nuclear growth, and it had to rely on the West. It acquired its first nuclear reactor, Aspara, from Britain in 1954, and 1100 Indian scientists were trained under the Atoms for Peace Program in the US. Meanwhile, India acquired the CIRUS reactor from Canada. This reactor was used in the Manhattan Project to make plotonium.
At the same time, the US supplied heavy water for the reactor, which was delivered solely and strictly for peaceful purposes. However, the later incidents proved that India exploited the opportunity to pursue its goal of developing nuclear arsenals. India refused to sign the treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and subsequently conducted a nuclear test in 1974. Following the proliferation concerns, the US not only banned nuclear trade with India but also initiated efforts for the establishment of the Nuclear Supplier Group to prevent the weaponization of a peaceful nuclear program. In the 1980s, India transformed the space launch vehicle SLV3 technology acquired with the assistance of Western Countries, for peaceful purposes, into the Agni medium-range ballistic missile.
These proliferations were not the only instance when India took strategic advantage from the West; during the Cold War era, India joined the Non-Aligned Movement yet through sheer opportunism tilted towards the USSR, while gaining military and economic assistance from both blocs. Contrary to its position as a non-aligned state in 1971, India entered into a twenty-year agreement of “Peace, friendship and cooperation” with the USSR. Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India shifted its policy towards the West, as evident in its call for full support of the war on terror.
The strategic opportunism manifested in India’s foreign policy. In the era of Great Power Competition, it emerged as a major beneficiary of the US strategic partnership, whilst being the largest trading partner of China. Under the pretext of strategic autonomy, despite US sanctions, India has strengthened its economic ties with Iran and Russia, consequently growing into a deep strategic partnership. The US sanctioned the Iranian nuclear program to halt its energy export, while India not only continued importing Iranian oil but also invested in Chahbahar port to gain strategic access to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India’s strategic autonomy could be better defined as a strategic opportunism. The recent Russia-Ukraine conflict, marked with sweeping economic, trade, and energy sanctions on Russia, while India enhanced its oil imports from Russia and rose as a strong strategic and defence partner. India not only refused to condemn Russia at the UN but also sought local currency settlement methods to get around dollar trade constraints. India is also a founding member of BRICS, a bloc of non-Western economies aiming for de-dollarization following the Trump tariff war.
For over 60 years, the border dispute and territorial claims between China and India have strained their bilateral relations, culminating in the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clash that killed at least two dozen Indian soldiers. To ease the tension at the Line of Actual Control, India signed a border deal with China in 2024, on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit. This disengagement and thaw in relations signaled an increase in economic cooperation between China and India, both of which are looking for more economic stimulants. According to research from the economic think tank GTRI, China has surpassed the US as India’s top trading partner, with USD 118.4 billion in two-way trade in 2023–2024. According to the report, India’s exports to China increased by 8.7% to USD 16.67 billion over the previous fiscal year.
New Delhi, with the booming trade relations with Beijing, still appears to be willing to keep up its competitive posture with China from a strategic standpoint and even strengthen ties with allies like the Quad that are committed to thwarting Chinese influence. India is again benefiting from both blocs under the umbrella of strategic autonomy, whilst pursuing strategic opportunism. The West cannot rely India as a counterbalance to China, as history demonstrates that India has consistently prioritized its own strategic and economic interests, adeptly leveraging ties with both rival blocs during the Cold War and, more recently, benefiting simultaneously from trade with Russia, Iran and China amidst renewed great power competition. India’s strategic ambitions characterized by the ICBMs having a range of up to 20,000 km, which could strike any point on the Earth’s surface. Once India develops ICBMs with extended ranges, Western capitals will be permanently on its target list.
—The writer is a Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.
(tahreembukhari1692@gmail.com)
