In response to India’s nuclear test in 1974, the multilateral export control organization Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established, an alliance of 48 countries that committed to controlling the export, retransfer, and safeguarding of sensitive materials that might encourage the development of nuclear weapons and promote nuclear trade for peaceful purposes.

Both India and Pakistan have formally submitted their requests to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), although they are not currently parties to the NPT. India’s situation is distinct because, in 2008, the US administration granted a special waiver to India, a non-NPT signatory state within the international nuclear regulatory framework, which dealt a serious blow to the non-proliferation regime.

However, Pakistan has faced ongoing opposition to its similar attempt. There are significant questions about the legality and coherence of the international non-proliferation framework that have been raised by Pakistan’s ongoing attempt to join the NSG. The disparity highlights broader geopolitical biases within the global export control institution. In recent times, many countries, including New Zealand, Ireland, Turkey, South Africa, Austria, Australia, Mexico, and Switzerland, have changed their minds on India’s inclusion in the NSG. China is the only participating nation that stands in the way of India’s membership in the NSG. China contends that membership in the organization should be granted based on established norms and that the same procedures that grant membership to India should apply to all new applicants.

In 2008, the US helped India through its advocacy for an exception from the NSG’s guidelines on nuclear trade and not permitting international inspections of its nuclear facilities. Despite reservations from other NSG members, the US pushed for the NSG waiver for India to strengthen its strategic alliance with the nation. The possibility of increased nuclear trade with India was another factor that spurred the US. The US describes China as its “major competitor” and portrays India as a “major defender” against China amid shifting geopolitical and strategic dynamics. Consequently, the US is favoring India’s NSG membership in a biased way while ignoring Pakistan’s bid. This puts Pakistan in a difficult position and has significant implications for the strategic stability of South Asia.

The Indian model outlined in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system INFCIRC/66, a set of technical procedures and inspections that the IAEA uses to verify that nations are adhering to their international pledges to refrain from using nuclear material to produce nuclear weapons. This framework, established before the NPT, continues to be followed in safeguards for non-NPT states. India has not yet classified its reactors as military or civilian, despite signing the IAEA Additional Protocol and committing to the 2008 U.S.-India deal. The Additional Protocol is a legal agreement between a country and the IAEA that grants the agency greater access to data and locations, enhancing its ability to verify that nuclear activities are peaceful. India’s military and civilian reactors are not fully separated. The difficulty in distinguishing between civilian and military reactors, combined with the lack of IAEA safeguards for Indian civilian reactors, has raised serious concerns in Pakistan regarding potential military applications. Additionally, allowing a non-NPT signatory to participate in civilian nuclear trade violates Articles I and II of the NPT. It may complicate the distinction between nuclear-armed and non-nuclear-armed states. The NSG’s non-discriminatory stance is undermined by the US’s preferential treatment of certain states.

Pakistan has a strong nuclear security framework, and all its civilian nuclear facilities are fully covered by comprehensive IAEA safeguards, a commitment that has been acknowledged and appreciated by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. However, despite that, Pakistan continues to face discriminatory treatment in global non-proliferation forums such as the NSG. SIPRI Yearbook 2025 has further highlighted India’s growing nuclear arsenal, rising from 172 to approximately 180 warheads, coupled with a troubling record of nuclear security lapses, including incidents of theft and loss of nuclear material. Granting India preferential consideration for NSG membership under these circumstances not only undermines the principles of non-discriminatory access and equal responsibility but also risks weakening the global non-proliferation regime by setting a precedent that overlooks substantive security and safeguard concerns.

While India wants the NSG to follow the so-called merit-based approach, Pakistan maintains that the NSG considers application criteria based on both states’ nuclear context. According to this merit-based approach, nations that have made noteworthy non-proliferation contributions or made considerable disarmament progress can be considered for membership or participation. This approach could be discriminatory, as it permits arbitrary assessments of a nation’s actions and contributions, potentially leading to inconsistent and biased decision-making. One state will benefit from greater access to the nuclear market and possibly be able to increase its nuclear arsenal. In addition to endangering the strategic stability between India and Pakistan, this would also upset the already precarious regional power dynamics in South Asia, which have been exacerbated by the recent escalation between the two countries.

Pakistan believes that its socioeconomic development depends on its participation in the NSG. In the coming years, Pakistan aims to increase the proportion of nuclear energy to 25 percent and generate 40,000 MW of electricity under the Nuclear Energy Vision 2050. To achieve this promising strategy, global cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology is necessary, and Pakistan can move closer to its 2050 ambition by joining the NSG. Therefore, through the NSG membership platform, Pakistan seeks international cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology applications to meet its growing energy demands.

Recently, reaching a final decision on India’s and Pakistan’s applications within a consensus-driven organization like the NSG has become difficult because the group has turned into another arena for an arms race and favoritism. The legitimacy of the NSG is being questioned due to the challenges in setting standards for these membership bids. The NSG’s role in the broader nuclear non-proliferation system would be undermined if the concerns of non-NPT states are not sincerely addressed, and the group could become outdated in the changing geopolitical landscape. Establishing fair and unbiased admission criteria for non-NPT states in the future will require members to work together to ensure openness, transparency, and trust within the NSG. Resolving the Indian and Pakistani NSG membership bids case effectively would boost the group’s efficacy and reputation.