Amid the recent U.S.-led attacks on Iranian nuclear installations (Operation Midnight Hammer, June 2025) and with new high-profile threats of nuclear proliferation, Washington is considering an out-of-the-box solution to the problem. A special military counter-proliferation division. Formalizing and incorporating kinetic action into American nonproliferation policy. Proponents argue this is a logical next step given President Trump’s recent vows, “We can’t let nuclear weapons proliferate,” and U.S. officials’ recommitments to the IAEA’s mission. They contend that only a “speak softly, carry a big stick” approach can deter proliferators who have grown accustomed to diplomatic wrangling.
Historically, the U.S nonproliferation efforts have not been even. For example, in the cases of Presidents Ford and Carter, Washington urged that South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil abandon plutonium reprocessing, considering it too near bomb production. In comparison, New Delhi was to a large extent permitted to build its nuclear programs, and later deals with Iran and North Korea would also trade unyielding enforcement with short-term diplomatic resolutions. Iraq was left to face the unambiguous force in solitude. The U.S. destroyed Saddam’s reactors and introduced strict inspections. Such inconsistency damages U.S. credibility. When proliferators are convinced that Washington will retreat at the bargaining table, they have little reason to relinquish.
This dilemma was highlighted by the recent attacks on Iran, together with Israel. On June 21, 2025, the U.S. bombers and missiles joined the Israeli aircraft attacking the Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan nuclear sites. The U.S government termed it as a small measure to safeguard troops and allies, yet the long-term effect remains unclear. Experts are alarmed that the attacks may deter nations from accepting IAEA inspections, as they may also fall victim to such attacks. For example, Erin Dumbacher of the Council on Foreign Relations states that the strike is likely to have a chilling effect on the nuclear nonproliferation activities of other countries worldwide, should they believe that transparency is an invitation to a military response.
However, proponents of more assertive action believe that enforcement is the foundation of arms control. Sokolski points out that historically, U.S policy was sending a straightforward message: do as we tell you or pay the price. This message would be institutionalized in the proposed “Nonproliferation Enforcement Initiative”. It would be charged with plotting any attacks, interdicting illegal shipments of arms, and neutralizing the growing threats. Importantly, it would liaise with geographic and technical combatant commands to ensure that U.S. forces worldwide can respond promptly to proliferation alerts.
The central part of the proposal is to assign a non-proliferation mission to the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Sokolski recommends that STRATCOM establish a specialized unit that has two branches: an intelligence-analysis staff and an exclusive strike team. The analytic group would assemble whatever information they could outside the usual IAEA channels and find out about possible hidden fuel manufacturing or weaponry. The military arm would be constituted by the rapid-reaction troops, especially long-range heavy bombers who are equipped with bunker-busting missiles, put on standby to attack any illicit facility anywhere in the world. With such a presence, strategic deterrence will be a two-way street; not only would the U.S. be deterred, but also other states would be discouraged from pursuing nuclear capabilities.
Practically, it implies deploying the B-2 stealth bomber with Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) to strike heavily buried enrichment plants – precisely what American B-2s in Iran did. Within the proposal, these planes would be mission-specific to counter-proliferation. They were kept on high alert and linked to the new intelligence unit. According to the U.S. officials, establishing such a command will invariably cause some feathers to be ruffled. This would necessitate re-determining a portion of bomber resources and redirecting STRATCOM resources. However, advocates of this claim argue that in case nonproliferation is indeed a mission that White House is designed for, it is time to realign the military to the mission.
Why now? There are several drivers. First is the Iran case itself. A new red line was indicated by President Trump’s order prohibiting Iranian uranium enrichment. According to the observers, Washington should be prepared to enforce that red line at all times; otherwise, the deterrence will be lost. When the U.S. ignores the notion that Saudi Arabia has its own peaceful enrichment program or that Iran is threatening to withdraw from the NPT, then the warning offered by Trump is empty. Moreover, an apparent counter-proliferation force would suggest that there is a price to be paid for such threats. In fact, Saudi leaders have directly threatened that, in case Iran acquires a bomb, Saudi Arabia would do the same; numerous observers worry that Riyadh, with a lack of realistic U.S. restraint, would run out of control in its nuclear aspirations.
The second one is a consistent policy. Washington has been found to face several difficulties in defining its red lines. Previous administrations had provided custom-made peaceful nuclear deals to India and Iran and then seen segments of them being transferred by bomb alternatives. Sokolski states that the IAEA and diplomacy have failed on numerous occasions to stop such creep. Since the Iran strike has been a precedent, he says, the U.S. has an opportunity to prove itself by making the strike permanent. Instead of handling every crisis individually, a permanent enforcement body would set the position in more than one theater.
Moreover, the American concept of extended deterrence is still employed by many U.S. partners rather than the creation of their own arsenals. According to scholars, allies of Seoul to Warsaw might lose trust and insurance in case Washington appears willing to discard nonproliferation rules. According to Ankit Panda, senior fellow at Carnegie, there are already other U.S. treaty allies who are worried about American commitment and may revert to the idea of nuclear options in case they feel that the U.S. may not defend them. A credible enforcement authority would reassure the allies that the U.S. will provide definitive support, which might turn friends into more reliable partners, relying on the U.S. as a nuclear umbrella.
This development presents significant challenges for arms control. Numerous arms-control activists caution that any attack on proliferators who have not been clearly mandated under a broader-based international framework undermines the NPT and the IAEA, as well as its mandate. In the case when the nations fear military retaliation, they may forsake safeguards and conceal their programs, like in the case of North Korea in 2003, since it left the NPT and later developed nukes. In this perspective, bullying tactics may cause a rift in the international nonproliferation system. This may cause other countries to doubt the utility of the NPT and voluntary inspection, as Dumbacher warns that attacking a state that has provided diplomacy with an opportunity may deter other nations.
Experts have also argued that transparency has already been a failure. The IAEA acknowledges that its inspections are not sensitive enough to prevent bomb projects by detecting hidden stockpiles. According to the analysis of NPEC, the process of uranium enrichment can take a state days away from bombing, which is much quicker than the process of warning. Credible force, in their opinion, is the insurance policy of the treaty commitments. Devoid of it, NPT will be a mere empty statement: most of them note that it is only due to U.S. diplomatic pressures and threats years ago that countries such as North Korea and India did not attain nuclear status. Practically, they contend, global nonproliferation has never been supported by American military force (as in the case of South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s).
In the future perspective, a consolidated counter-proliferation force would redefine the future of arms control. On the one hand, it may enhance deterrence. Proliferators may reconsider their intentions when they observe bombers who are about to take a short flight. It might also compel the U.S. policymakers to clarify a red line (with Iran, North Korea, etc.) and speak with one voice with allies. Conversely, its very presence is an indication that the US is more militarized in its approach to nonproliferation than decades of diplomacy through treaties. This can provide fodder for discussions on sovereignty, the rule of law, and who should determine what constitutes a proliferation threat. Arms control analysts will closely follow to determine whether this big stick policy prompts other countries to arm or to revert to diplomacy.
This initiative has gained the support of like-minded individuals, as, unless there is an enforcement arm, Washington would not be taken seriously on the issue of proliferation. It has also received support in other quarters of the Pentagon, which appreciates the value of a consistent counter-proliferation mission. Opponents, such as analyst at CFR and Chatham House caution citing unintended effects on arms control norms. The dilemma now revolves around a basic decision: whether the U.S. will shift its focus more toward military deterrence to uphold the NPT, or will, it trust diplomatic instruments again and allow another North Korea or Iran to slip out of the system?
